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I. INTRODUCTION
While a significant body of legal scholarship has emerged on
appellate judicial opinion style, 1 little systemic study has been given
to examining the nature of modern American concurring opinion
style. Style is an ambiguous and eclectic concept, and the opinion
style of Judge Richard A. Posner, former Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and oft-mentioned
candidate to become a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, is worth trying to delineate and to understand. 2
In a series of three previous articles, I analyzed Judge Posner’s
general opinion style during his “rookie season” as a federal
appellate court judge, 3 Posner’s inchoate dissenting opinion style
over the course of his first decade on the court of appeals, 4 and his
maturing dissenting opinion style in his later years on the bench. 5
In this Article, I turn to Judge Posner’s concurring opinion style
1 See Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner’s Appellate
Opinions, 1981–82—Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an Extraordinary
Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 656–84 (2000) [hereinafter Blomquist, Playing on
Words] (referencing various views on judicial opinion style, including distinguished judges,
professors, and attorneys).
2 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing The Next Supreme Court Justice:
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004); Stephen J. Choi &
G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking The Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19
(2005); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias (as a
Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279, 1299 (2007) (stating that “Richard
Posner, who shows [up] at the top of almost every citation ranking of either judges or legal
academics, shows up” as the most frequently cited judicial opinion writer by the United States
Court of Appeals judges of the opposite political party).
3 See Blomquist, Playing on Words, supra note 1.
4 Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s First Decade of
Dissenting Opinions, 1981–1991—Toward an Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 MO.
L. REV. 73 (2004) [hereinafter Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style].
5 Robert F. Blomquist, Judge Posner’s Dissenting Judicial Oeuvre and the Aesthetics of
Canonicity, 36 N.M. L. REV. 161 (2006) [hereinafter Blomquist, Aesthetics of Canonicity]; see
also THE QUOTABLE JUDGE POSNER: SELECTIONS FROM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF JUDICIAL
OPINIONS OF RICHARD A. POSNER (Robert F. Blomquist ed., forthcoming 2008).
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during his first quarter century of appellate judging.
The structure of the remainder of this Article, before my
conclusion, is as follows. First, in Part II, before taking up Judge
Posner’s concurring opinions, I probe for a working description of
the nature and motivations for modern American concurring
judicial opinions by looking at previous legal scholarship and
exemplars of judicial concurrence. 6 In Part III, I analyze the
published concurring opinions written by Judge Posner during
1981–2006—his lifetime tenure to date on the federal appellate
bench. 7 Finally, in Part IV, I offer some general observations about
Judge Posner’s concurring opinion style, and consider some
implications of my study for better understanding the form and
function of American concurring judicial opinions. 8
II. THE NATURE OF CONCURRING OPINIONS
A. Background
Interestingly, and ironically, the etymology of the word concur
starts in the fifteenth century as meaning “to run together,
assemble, meet, rush together in hostility” and “[t]o run together
violently or with a shock; to come into collision; to collide.” 9 Over
the ensuing centuries concur softened in meaning to also encompass
“flow[ing] together, as streams (material or immaterial),” “[t]o
converge and meet,” “[t]o combine in action, to co-operate,” and “[t]o
agree in opinion.” 10 The cognate word concurrence developed a few
centuries after the first English usage of the word concur. 11
Concurrence came to mean “[r]unning together, confluence;
meeting,” “[o]ccurrence together in time, of events or circumstances;
coincidence; a juncture,” and “[c]ombination in effecting any purpose
or end, or in doing any work; co-operation of agents or causes.” 12
Indeed, a concurring judicial opinion can be testy—or even
downright hostile—to the majority opinion from which it reacts; this
is, perhaps, most probable in the case of a partial dissent and a
partial concurrence combined in the same opinion. In the case of a
See infra notes 9–78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79–399 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 400–433 and accompanying text.
9 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 675 (2d ed. 1989).
10 See id.
11 See id. at 676.
12 Id.
6
7
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pure concurring opinion, however, we would expect the opinion to be
congenial to the opinion in chief of the majority or plurality—
although this can probably not be presumed; perhaps the
concurrence agrees with the result or the reasoning of the court but
takes the principal opinion of the court to task for not going far
enough in expanding the holding, or for the opposite reason of going
too far.
The motivation of an appellate judge in writing a dissenting
opinion—or even a partial dissent—is intuitively obvious (i.e., a
dissenting opinion disagrees to one degree or another with the
holding, reasoning, or combined holding/reasoning of the principal
opinion in a case). 13 The reason why a judge would go to the trouble
of writing a concurring opinion—an opinion in agreement or partial
agreement with the chief opinion of a court—is harder to fathom.
One must assume that there are costs and benefits of writing a
separate concurrence. Costs include extra time and effort in the
context of a pressing docket of cases and an expectation that each
judge is responsible for writing a fair share of the opinions of the
court, alienation or possible alienation of one’s judicial colleagues,
and opening one’s concurring opinion to outside criticism by
commentators and the press. What might the broad theoretical
benefits be of writing a separate concurring opinion? No doubt
there are reasons for writing a concurring opinion which overlap
with writing a dissenting opinion: self-expression, advancing the
truth, competing with other judges and academics in the legal
marketplace of ideas, improving the majority’s final work product by
forcing the prevailing side to deal with points raised in the
concurrence, and mental honing of a judge’s agreement and
disagreement with the majority’s approach to a particular legal area
Moreover, one type of
(e.g., freedom of the press issues). 14
dissenting opinion, termed a “collaborative” dissent by Professor
Charles Fried, is closely related to a concurring opinion since both
attempt to work with the premises and reasoning of the majority’s
approach as a cooperative effort to further shape the development of

13 For a discussion of the various motivations an appellate judge might have for writing a
dissenting judicial opinion, see Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style, supra note 4, at 76–83. It
should be noted that it is conceivable that trial court judges—when convened as a tribunal of
special district court judges by statutory arrangement—may write dissenting or concurring
opinions from the chief opinion of the tribunal; however, this is rare. My assumption in this
Article is that appellate judges write concurring or dissenting opinions when they choose to
write separately from the majority or plurality of an appellate court.
14 Cf. id.
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future legal doctrine. 15 In contradistinction, no cooperation is
apparent in the case of the other kind of dissent, described by Fried
as “oppositional” dissent. 16
B. Some Traditional Views on Concurring Opinions
As pointed out in Robert A. Leflar’s Appellate Judicial Opinions,
the use of concurring opinions by appellate judges “varies from court
to court and from judge to judge.” 17 Most legal observers probably
share the view that concurring opinions should not be routinely
issued and should “respect the doctrine of stare decisis” while
suggesting “an evolution of legal principles required by changed
conditions and concepts.” 18
One author has suggested two scenarios that justify the writing of
thoughtful concurring opinions. First, “[u]pon occasion, the opinion
of a majority will not actually be erroneous, yet it will verge upon
error by straining a legal doctrine to its utmost.” 19 In this context,
“a considered and well-stated concurring opinion can be of value by
warning that the doctrine must not be pressed too far.” 20 Second,
“[i]n other instances, a majority may announce a doctrine which is
sound when applied to the facts before the court, but which would
be wholly unsound if given a general application.” 21 In this closely
related instance, “a timely concurring opinion may suffice to check
any extension of the doctrine, and thereby better our
jurisprudence.” 22
Another author, focusing on the work of the Michigan Supreme
Court, addressed the problematics of a concurrence in result only
that does not explain the basis of the concurrence. 23 What are
readers to make of such unexplained concurrences and are they
helpful or unhelpful?
When a [judge] concurs in result only, but does not bother to
explain why he does not also concur in the opinions of other
15 See Charles Fried, Comment, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116
HARV. L. REV. 163, 180–83 (2002).
16 See id.
17 APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 203 (Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974).
18 R. Dean Moorhead, The 1952 Ross Prize Essay: Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38
A.B.A. J. 821, 884 (1952).
19 Id. at 823.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See Richard S. Miller, The Work of the Michigan Supreme Court During the Survey
Period: A Statistical Analysis, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1964–1965).
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[judges] who favor the same result, he leaves several
possibilities open. Perhaps he disagrees with the reasoning
of the other [judges], believing it to be faulty. If so, he would
seem to have an obligation, possibly constitutional in nature,
to set forth the correct reasoning as he sees it. If his
objection is to the scope or breadth of the decision or of some
dictum in the opinion, his reasons might become very useful
in restricting or broadening the effect of his brethren’s
opinions in future cases. Certainly the benefit of his
different reasoning might prove helpful to other appellate
courts considering a similar problem, or possibly to [the same
reconstituted appellate court] reconsidering the same
problem at some future date. 24
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing in a 1973
article, opined that constitutional adjudication—at least in the
Supreme Court of the United States—“invites, at least, if does not
require, more separate opinions [by appellate judges] than does
adjudication of issues of law in other areas.” 25 This tendency to
write separate concurring opinions, or dissenting opinions,
Rehnquist theorized, exists because “stare decisis does not have the
same weight in constitutional interpretation as in other cases” and
there might be an incentive, therefore, of an appellate judge to
“want to state his own views if they differ significantly from those of
the majority [of the court].” 26

Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). The author of this article goes on to muse:
Perhaps [the concurring-in-result only appellate judge] is too busy with other opinions
to waste his time reporting a minor disagreement. Perhaps he agrees with the reasoning
of his colleagues but dislikes the language they used to express it. Or he thinks the
opinion may be an unpopular one and does not wish to be recorded as joining it. Perhaps
he has not had an opportunity to examine the briefs and records carefully or to research
the problem, but concurs in result simply because he feels, instinctively, that the
outcome is correct. No one, of course, is entitled to draw any of these conclusions from a
concurrence in result . . . . The point is, however, that anyone is entitled to conclude that
[an appellate judge] had some reason for not joining his colleague’s opinion. Such a
concurrence provides no guidance and, unfortunately, casts a shadow on the
authoritativeness of the signed opinion while leaving open a question about the motives
of the concurring [judge]. A written opinion, even a brief one, setting forth [an appellate
judge’s] reasons for concurring separately would eliminate these difficulties.
Id. at 12, 14.
25 Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.A. J. 361,
363 (1973).
26 Id.
24
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C. Recent Takes on Concurring Opinions
Barry A. Miller suggests, in a 2002 article, that a customary role
for a concurring opinion is to discern a legal issue “as relevant but
decide[] that it is not dispositive and leav[e] it for another day.” 27
Miller cited a concurrence by Justice Kennedy in Wisconsin
Department of Corrections v. Schacht as exemplifying this kind of
concurring opinion. 28
In an exchange between Professors Barry Friedman and Robert
W. Bennett, in a 2001 law review symposium, both academics
seemed to agree that while litigation is “party-centered,” other
views of important legal and policy questions are raised by
concurring judicial opinions (in conjunction with dissenting opinions
and amici briefs). 29 Accordingly, a concurring judicial opinion can
play the role of a limited “conversation” about critical questions
embedded in a democratic society. 30 Sometimes, this conversation
between jurists who render separate judicial opinions changes other
jurists’ minds in future cases. 31 Other, more cynical, observers
contend that in some appellate courts—particularly the Supreme
Court of the United States—judges are not really interested in
using separate concurring (and dissenting) opinions for purposes of
engaging in an open conversation with their colleagues; rather,
according to this view, separate opinions are, now, routinely farmed
out to law clerks for writing in a kind of one-upmanship display of
competition between appellate judges more interested in rebutting
or neutralizing the rhetoric of other appellate judges. 32
27 Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1301 n.245 (2002).
28 Id. (citing Wis. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“noting important questions but suggesting resolution in a later case following
full briefing and argument”)).
29 See Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 845, 883–84 (2001); Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the
Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 946 (2001).
30 See Friedman, supra note 29, at 946; cf. Bennett, supra note 29, at 888.
31 See Daniel Gordon, Brennan’s State Constitutional Era Twenty-Five Years Later—The
History, the Present, and the State Constitutional Wall, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1031, 1034 n.35
(2000) (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN
RETROSPECT 354–55 (1957)).
32 See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE
EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 29, 271–73 (1998) (asserting that Supreme
Court law clerks perform vital functions including drafting majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions, and exchange between the Justices in voting conferences is non-existent);
Nadine J. Wichern, Comment, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving Justice in the Media
Age, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 621, 652 (1999) (arguing that on the current Supreme Court, law
clerks spend much of their time writing separate opinions with little supervision); Wichern,
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With his Yankee common sense and his own considerable
experience as a United States Court of Appeals Judge, Frank M.
Coffin offers his unique take on when concurring opinions are
justified in his 1994 book, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering, and
Judging. 33 Coffin compares a concurring opinion with a dissenting
opinion: “A concurrence is like a fencing foil; it elegantly makes its
usually bloodless points. A dissent, on the other hand, is more like
a broadsword. It takes more resolution and commitment to wield it
and there is the expectation of drawing at least a little blood.” 34 As
Judge Coffin sees it, appellate judges are vindicated in penning
concurring opinions in four circumstances:
1. When a judge strongly prefers a different theory or
ground to support the result, e.g., the judge would not reach
the merits because of a procedural bar.
2. When a judge wishes to limit the holding, e.g., the judge
concurs in this case involving the interstate transfer of
prisoners but would not extend this to apply to an intrastate
transfer.
3. When a judge wishes to expand a holding, e.g., the
judge points out that the instant case by its reasoning and
holding effectively overrules a precedent.
4. When a judge wishes to expand the majority’s reasoning
on a particular point, e.g., the judge wishes to drive home a
point to the bar or the trial courts, or to address a dissenter’s
argument in a more thorough manner than would fit the
court’s opinion. 35
Professor Cass R. Sunstein, in his 1999 book, One Case at a Time,
supra, at 652 n.226 (suggesting that an example of a situation where a law clerk was probably
delegated the power to write a “concurring opinion in a case with large ramifications [was in]
Washington v. Glucksberg, the assisted suicide case, in which Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
wrote a concurrence qualifying the majority’s opinion by warning that the case did not mean
there was a constitutional right to a physician’s aid in dying” (citing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736–38 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
33 FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING (1994).
34 Id. at 227.
35 Id. at 226–27. According to Judge Coffin:
A judge should never merely declare that she concurs.
This is no more
illuminating . . . than two examples collected for a judges’ seminar . . . :
I concur in the result and so much of the opinion as supports the result.
And this gem, delivered by an Irish chief justice, after hearing the view of his two
colleagues:
I agree with the decision of my brother on the right for the reasons stated by my
brother on the left.
Id. at 227 (endnote omitted); cf. supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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highlighted the pivotal role played by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
through her use of “minimalist” concurring judicial opinions on the
Supreme Court. 36 According to Sunstein, Justice O’Connor came to
be known for characteristic minimalist concurrences that “typically
limit the reach of majority decisions, suggest ways of
accommodating both sides, and insist to the losers that they haven’t
Professor Mark Tushnet
lost everything, or for all time.” 37
amplified Sunstein’s insights about the role of concurring opinions
on the Supreme Court in his foreword to the Harvard Law Review
analysis of the Supreme Court’s 1998 Term. 38 Professor Ronald
Dworkin largely agrees with Sunstein’s insight that concurring
opinions on the Court often serve to narrow the scope of the
majority opinion. 39
Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski, in a 1997 article, 40 analyzed a
concurring opinion by Judge Guido Calabresi in United States v.
Then 41 as an example of a “constitutional flare to Congress.” 42 Then
involved a case that presented the question of “whether the
sentencing disparity between persons convicted of crimes involving
crack and powder cocaine constituted a violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s implied guarantee of equal protection of the laws.” 43
Judge Calabresi used a concurring opinion to the Second Circuit
rejection of Then’s constitutional attacks on the sentencing disparity
to warn Congress that a future case might prove to be
unconstitutional. 44 As explained by Professor Krotoszynski:
Judge Calabresi [in his concurrence] was very careful not
to give a formal opinion as to how the court would resolve a
later case involving his hypothetical facts. He simply noted
that the existence of compelling evidence demonstrating a
racial linkage would give a reviewing court pause, should
Congress maintain a stance of benign neglect or, worse yet,
[allow the 100:1 ratio to continue] notwithstanding a
36 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
xiii (1999).
37 Id.
38 Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 93–94 (1999).
39 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1078.
40 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1998).
41 See 56 F.3d 464, 466–69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
42 Krotoszynski, supra note 40, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 Id. at 11.
44 Id. at 13.
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Sentencing Commission proposal to revise the disparity
downward.
Judge Calabresi rhetorically raised two
questions: (1) Precisely at what point does a court say that
what once made sense no longer has any rational basis? and
(2) What degree of legislative action, or of conscious inaction,
is needed when that (uncertain) point is reached?
Significantly, Judge Calabresi made no attempt to answer
his own questions. On the contrary, he admitted that their
very existence powerfully counseled in favor of restraint. 45
For Krotoszynski, Judge Calabresi’s concurring opinion in Then
was justified.
Contrary to the panel majority taking Judge
Calabresi “to task for offering Congress advice on its core policymaking functions,” 46 Professor Krotoszynski supports Judge
Calabresi’s concurring opinion as a type of traditional dialogue
between the judiciary and Congress. 47 Moreover, “judges routinely
offer opinions on matters of constitutional law in various ways,”
according to Krotoszynski, “including dicta, alternative holdings,
and concurrences.” 48 From a broader philosophical perspective,
“[g]iven that federal judges must write opinions that attempt to
justify their rulings, the question of how much to write cannot be
avoided. Some judges will write more, some will write less.” 49 Some
will write concurring opinions. Some will choose to remain silent.
Professor Henry T. Greely performed a quantitative analysis of
the career judicial opinions of Judge John Minor Wisdom of the
United States Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit in a 1996 article. 50
Greely made the interesting observation that Judge Wisdom
exhibited an “increasing willingness to write separately in en banc
decisions” 51 ; two explanations for this tendency are: (1) the natural

45 Id. at 13–14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted). Krotoszynski went
on to observe:
Rather than simply ignore the mounting data that augur against the constitutionality
of the disparity, Judge Calabresi [in his concurring opinion] was remarkably candid. In
his view, the Sentencing Guidelines ratio might be heading toward unconstitutionality in
light of changed circumstances. But he clearly and expressly reserved final judgment.
At the end of the day, he confessed that future circumstances might, or might not,
provide sufficient support for a claim similar to the claim pressed by Then.
Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 16.
48 Id. at 34.
49 Id. (footnote omitted).
50 See Henry T. Greely, Quantitative Analysis of a Judicial Career: A Case Study of Judge
John Minor Wisdom, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1996).
51 Id. at 118.
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contentiousness of cases set by the full circuit court for rehearing en
banc, and (2) the greater importance of en banc decisions compared
to panel decisions to the “law of the circuit.” 52 Thus, over twentyfive percent of Judge Wisdom’s concurring opinions on the Fifth
Circuit “were written in response to en banc decisions of the
court.” 53 Generalizing his data collection to United States Circuit
Judges in all appellate circuits, Professor Greely noted that
“[a]lmost all [circuit] judges write more dissenting opinions than
concurring opinions, but not all.” 54 Moreover, Greely pointed out
that “judges sampled from the Ninth and the District of Columbia
Circuits seem to write separately much more often than . . . other
circuit[] [judges].” 55 Offering comparisons with other circuit judges,
including Judge Posner, Professor Greely concluded:
Overall, Judge Wisdom’s separate opinion profile seems
most like that of his old friend Judge Tuttle of the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, Judge Goodwin of the Ninth Circuit, and
Judges Cummings and Posner of the Seventh Circuit. Each
of those judges writes separately about 10% of the time and
writes separate concurrences quite infrequently. Beyond the
fact that all those judges are well respected, it is hard to find
other similarities between them. 56
United States Circuit Judge Edward R. Becker made an incisive
point in an article entitled In Praise of Footnotes about the
important role that footnotes play in concurring or dissenting
judicial opinions. 57 As Judge Becker sees it, footnotes in separate
opinions can be strategically deployed by an appellate judge to “call
into question the correctness or prudence of a rule of law espoused
by the majority opinion, or [to] advocate a new or different rule.” 58
Becker explains how a footnote in a concurring or dissenting opinion
can maximize the potential future impact of a separate judicial
opinion by observing:
Opinions of this genre, if they are to have their intended
effect of law reform, must perforce be scholarly and
detailed; . . . footnotes often play an important role in
scholarly exegesis. Footnotes make it possible to define
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id.
Id. at 128 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 129.
Edward R. Becker, In Praise of Footnotes, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 7 (1996).
Id.
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confusing terms and to explain potentially confusing but
extraneous procedural issues that seemed important at one
point but later turned out not to be dispositive. They also
make it possible to set forth unobtrusively jurisdiction or
standard of review . . . , and to identify analogous but
unconnected proceedings (explaining their relevance). These
matters are of especial value to the novice reader. Finally,
footnotes can even be used to inject some humor into an
opinion or to offer an interesting aside. 59
In a fascinating 1995 student note, Igor Kirman focuses on the
proliferation of concurring opinions by United States Supreme
Court Justices. 60 Kirman observes that “[f]luctuating from a low of
one in 1937 to a high of ninety-five in 1981, the rising incidence of
concurring opinions [by Supreme Court justices] suggests a need to
understand their role in modern Supreme Court jurisprudence.” 61
Moreover, “[c]ontributing to this need,” according to Kirman, is the
impact that some concurring opinions by Supreme Court justices
have had on the evolution of legal doctrine on the Court. 62 Kirman
distinguishes between two fundamentally different kinds of
Supreme Court concurring opinions: (1) a concurrence in judgment
which is “[w]ritten by a Justice who does not join the majority
opinion” and “is intended to express agreement with the majority’s
result but not with its reasoning,” 63 and (2) a simple concurrence
which “is written by a Justice who agrees both with the majority’s
result and with its reasoning, but [who] writes separately
nonetheless.” 64
While Kirman’s differentiation of types of
concurring opinions is driven by his concern for elucidating the
precedential value of various concurrences by Supreme Court
Justices, 65 his analytical framework also sheds light on appellate
59 Id. (footnotes omitted). Judge Becker, however, acknowledges the negative view Judge
Posner holds for footnotes in judicial opinions: “‘The principal appeal [of the footnote] is to the
author . . . . [sic] it spares him the pain of having to discard anything he considers to have
some value or interest, and it enables him to show, or at least pretend, that he is hardworking, learned and scrupulous.’” Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
60 Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1995).
61 Id. at 2083 (footnotes omitted).
62 Id. at 2083–84, 2084 n.7 (citing as an example Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
63 Id. at 2084. “The concurrence in judgment is really a dissent from the rationale of the
majority opinion.” Id.
64 Id. (footnote omitted).
65 Id. at 2119.
The “two-step inquiry” will allow “lower courts [to] minimize the
precedential chaos that results when they give decisional force to a concurring opinion that
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concurring opinion styles, in general. For example, it is instructive
to pay closer attention, on the one hand, to what a concurring
appellate judge is claiming she is doing (say, a judge who contends
that she agrees with the majority’s result and reasoning), and, on
the other hand, to what a concurring appellate judge is functionally
doing in the actual language of her concurrence. For example, she
departs from the reasoning of the majority opinion by being more
expansive or restrictive than the holding—as opposed to merely
clarifying, restating, or summarizing the majority’s opinion.
Indeed, while all separate appellate opinions (pure dissenting,
partial dissenting and concurring, and pure concurring) can be read
for shades of meaning and types of ambiguity, it would appear that
separate opinions labeled as concurrences by judicial authors—in
whole or in part—are likely to contain the most complex layers of
ambiguity. This is because an appellate judge who claims that he is
concurring with the majority opinion (partially or completely) is
overtly or covertly attempting “to inspire consubstantiality” through
the use of the rhetorical trope of a concurrence; such a rhetorical
strategy by an appellate judge is “designed to unite” members of the
majority and the concurring judge or judges “in spite of members’
divergent tendencies,” requiring “persuasively encompassing
Thus a
competing values at a sufficiently abstract level.” 66
rhetorical trope, like a judicial concurring opinion, is similar to
Professor David Zarefsky’s discussion of a “condensation symbol”
which has “no clear referent but serve[s] to ‘condense’ into one
symbol a host of different meanings and connotations which might
diverge if more specific referents were attempted.” 67
may be at odds with its corresponding majority opinion.” Id.
66 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 24 (Thomas O. Sloane ed., 2001).
67 DAVID ZAREFSKY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON’S WAR ON POVERTY: RHETORIC AND HISTORY 10–
11 (1986). There are, alas, many rhetorical uses of ambiguity. By way of illustration:
[T]he U.S. Constitution and many diplomatic agreements depend on their ambiguities to
provide flexibility without sacrificing unity. Like rhetorical tropes, especially irony,
humor and puns rely on their measure of ambiguity to advance strategically a point or to
inspire consubstantiality.
Argumentative strategies, such as association and disassociation, operate by
maneuvering ambiguous interpretative boundaries.
Association attempts to link
meaningfully referents formerly viewed as unrelated and thus create a fresh interpretive
and evaluative context for the issue at hand. Disassociation strategically divides that
which is interpreted currently as unitary into distinct parts that invite divergent
evaluations.
Transcendence and transformation operate similarly, strategically
changing the scope and circumference of a phenomenon’s interpretive borders and so
redefining meaning.
Another . . . . rhetorical use of ambiguity is to deny its presence. Declaring that a
purportedly ambiguous issue actually is not so may be designed to convince auditors to
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Professor Scott C. Idleman, in a 1995 article, touches on the
function of appellate judicial concurring opinions in his discussion of
judicial candor. 68 According to Idleman’s analysis, progress in “the
long-term doctrinal or conceptual development of the law” 69 may
arguably be advanced by encouraging judges, who choose to write
separately from their respective courts, to “plant[] seed[s]” or
“squirrel[]” away ideas for “new principles or doctrines in
Idleman cites Judge Posner for the
subsequent . . . cases.” 70
proposition that concurring opinions (along with dissents) “‘have
played so important a role in the development of the law that it
would be a great error to suppress them; it would actually make law
less rather than more certain, by concealing from the bar important
clues to the law of the future.’” 71
Professors Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, in a
jointly authored 1993 article in the California Law Review,
undertook an ambitious project which offered important insights on
the need for appellate courts, as collegial enterprises, to reconcile
votes by individual judges on the outcome of the overall case with
the views by these judges on each of the issues in the case (provided
by concurrences of one sort or another). 72 Considering this problem
with special reference to the Supreme Court of the United States,
support the rhētōr as a leader clear-sighted and determined enough to steer them
effectively through this troubling “apparent” indeterminacy.
Finally, a rhetor
strategically may highlight ambiguity’s presence, then argue that it is impossible to
resolve it satisfactorily, even temporarily. This tactic serves to block agreement on a
proposed judgment or course of action.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC, supra note 66, at 24 (citations omitted). See generally WILLIAM
EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY (Chatto & Windus, 3d ed. 1963) (1956) (widely
recognized as the last century’s landmark opus systematizing and defending literary uses of
ambiguity).
68 See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307
(1995).
69 Id. at 1370.
70 Id. at 1370–71 (footnotes omitted).
71 Id. at 1371 n.205 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
236 (1985)). Idleman, however, is ultimately skeptical about encouraging judicial candor too
much because of countervailing considerations of judicial restraint. Id. at 1372. In
concluding his article on judicial candor, Idleman quotes an old article by Robert A. Leflar,
Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 819 (1961):
Candor . . .
“is a virtue, in judicial opinions as elsewhere, and we need much more of it. But to ‘tell
all,’ with complete and unmitigated candor, is not always a virtue in judicial opinions
or elsewhere. Restraint may be a virtue too, for reasons sometimes of decency and
sometimes of wise planning.”
Idelman, supra note 68, at 1416.
72 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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Kornhauser and Sager make a whimsical but vital conceptual
distinction between what they call “true concurrences,” on the one
hand, and “two-cents concurrences,” on the other.
“True” concurring opinions . . . are not measurably less
problematic than dissents, since they are dissents from the
rationale adopted by the majority. “True” concurrences
announce and defend the author’s unwillingness to subscribe
to the majority’s rationale for an outcome that the author
supports. By contrast, in “two-cents” concurrences, the
author is willing to join in both the outcome and rationale
sponsored by the majority, but wishes to add her own,
presumably consistent, thoughts on the matter. 73
Interestingly, “[i]n Supreme Court practice, ‘true’ concurrences
are introduced with the phrase ‘Justice X, concurring in the
judgment,’ while ‘two-cents’ concurrences are introduced with the
phrase, ‘Justice X, concurring.’” 74 Moreover, “[i]n recent years, it
has been increasingly common for Justices who join in the majority
outcome to write separately to explain their agreement with
discrete portions of the majority rationale and their disagreement
with others.” 75 Indeed, “[o]pinions of this sort,” in the Supreme
Court, “are now introduced with the phrase, ‘Justice X, concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment.’” 76 Professors Kornhauser
and Sager argue that all appellate courts—consistent with their
function as “‘collegial enterprises’”—should “directly confront the
doctrinal paradox” of separate concurring opinions and “deliberately
determine the method of case decision that will control.” 77 They
conclude “that the best method for choosing between decisional
methods is” a so-called “‘metavote’” whereby the members of an
appellate court would “vot[e] for a particular method after
discussing such factors as whether the outcome or rationales for it
are more important, whether the issues to be decided are
independent, the seriousness of the consequences of the outcome,
hierarchical management concerns, and internal management
considerations.” 78
III. TEN WAYS TO LOOK AT THE CONCURRING OPINIONS OF JUDGE
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 8 n.14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id.
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RICHARD A. POSNER
A. Statistics
During his first twenty-five years as a United States Court of
Appeals Judge—measured from his starting date during the fall of
1981 79 until the end of 2006 (technically, a bit longer than twentyfive years)—Judge Richard A. Posner wrote a total of 2,272
published opinions, or an average of about ninety-one opinions per
year. 80
The distribution of Judge Posner’s fifty-four pure concurring
See Blomquist, Playing on Words, supra note 1, at 684.
Of these 2,272 opinions, Judge Posner wrote 2,122 opinions for the Seventh Circuit
majority. Posner authored a total of 150 published separate opinions during this timeframe;
these separate opinions consisted of eighty-three dissenting opinions, fifty-four pure
concurring opinions, and thirteen mixed concurring/dissenting opinions. My research
assistant and I calculated these figures based on a hand count of all published authored
opinions by Judge Posner on the Westlaw federal court Seventh Circuit database of published
opinions. The following table summarizes this information.
79
80

Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

Majority
3
77
81
77
88
78
79
72
72
86
73
77
98
100
89
103
88
83
90
80
85
89
79
102
75
98
2,122

Concurrence
0
2
7
4
6
3
4
3
3
3
1
1
0
2
2
0
0
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
54

Concurrence/Dissent
0
0
3
1
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
13

Dissent
0
6
5
5
9
4
2
3
3
5
4
6
3
1
2
2
0
2
5
2
1
3
5
0
1
4
83

Total
3
85
96
87
103
86
85
80
78
94
79
84
101
103
94
105
89
86
98
84
88
94
86
104
77
103
2,272
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opinions over these twenty-five years is illuminating. From late
1981 through the end of 1986, he wrote twenty-two concurring
opinions (40.7% of his career concurring opinions); from 1987
through the end of 1991, he wrote fourteen concurring opinions
(25.9% of his career concurring opinions); from 1992 through the
end of 1996, he wrote five concurring opinions (9.3% of his career
concurring opinions); from 1997 through the end of 2001, he
authored six concurring opinions (11.1% of his career concurring
opinions); and from 2002 through the end of 2006, he wrote seven
concurring opinions (13.0% of his career concurring opinions). 81
Thus—consistent with my findings regarding the frequency of his
dissenting opinions 82 —as Judge Posner’s tenure on the bench
lengthened, he tended to write fewer concurring opinions (with an
interesting uptick of concurrences during his most recent period as
an appellate judge). A possible reason for Posner’s generally
decreasing rate and number of concurring opinions is his heightened
satisfaction with Seventh Circuit opinions. “Posner’s increased
satisfaction, in turn, is probably related to both his own
persuasiveness in convincing his colleagues to adopt his reasoning
on assorted legal issues and to the appointment of more like-minded
judges to the Seventh Circuit (as well as the Supreme Court).” 83
Other possible reasons for Posner’s decreasing rate of concurring
opinions are Posner’s judicial maturation over time, his intermittent
role as Chief Judge, and his ambition for appointment to the
Supreme Court.
B. Different Ways to Look at Posner’s Concurrences
Splitting a subject into multiple perspectives—or ways of
looking—can yield interesting insights. Indeed, two women writing
in separate fields—Jane Smiley in literary criticism and Gretchen
Rubin 84 in political biography—provide inspiration for those of us
81 See id. My statistics do not reflect the type of pure concurring opinions written by Judge
Posner. However, in the discussion that follows I do make analytical distinctions of what
kinds of concurring judicial opinions Judge Posner wrote. See infra notes 84–399 and
accompanying text.
82 See Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style, supra note 4, at 94 (discussing the finding that the
frequency of Judge Posner’s dissenting opinions decrease corresponding to his judicial
tenure).
83 Id. (providing a similar observation to account for the decreased rate of Posnerian
dissenting opinions over his judicial career).
84 Rubin has a stellar legal background. She received her undergraduate and law degrees
from Yale and was editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal. She clerked for Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor of the U.S. Supreme Court and served as counsel to the Federal
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writing in the discipline of law. Smiley, in her book Thirteen Ways
of Looking at the Novel, 85 crafted an intimate writerly series of
meditations on the many facets of novels and novel-writing. Among
the assorted ways of thinking about her subject, Smiley considered
“what is a novel”; “who is a novelist”; “the origins of the novel”; “the
psychology of the novel”; “morality and the novel”; and “reading a
hundred novels.” 86
Rubin, in Forty Ways to Look at Winston Churchill, provides a
fascinating rationale for her fragmented glimpses of the long life of
the famous British statesman, author, and adventure-seeker. 87
Rubin explained:
As I plunged into his life, a truth (often noted, often
overlooked) confronted me: Churchill’s portrait could be
drawn in innumerable ways, all “true.” I was struck to see
his biographers reach different conclusions from the same
facts. Was Churchill a military genius or a meddling
amateur? Was he a great defender of liberty or a reactionary
imperialist? Was he a success or a failure? Once I had
command of the material, I amused myself by tracing how
each account exaggerated certain details, and slid over
others, to support its conclusions. 88
Rubin’s observation that facts are subject to “multiple
interpretations and characterizations” 89 is edifying and provocative.
Moreover, her description of the artistic tradition of a “multi-angle
approach” 90 is fascinating:
There’s a long tradition of reexamining the same subject
in multiple ways: the four Gospels, Bach’s Goldberg
Communications Commission Chairman Reed Hundt. She taught at Yale Law School and
Yale School of Management. For a further discussion and analysis of Rubin’s work, see
http://www.gretchenrubin.com/about/about.html.
85 JANE SMILEY, THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOKING AT THE NOVEL (2005).
86 Id. at vii (capitalization omitted) (chapter headings in table of contents). As she explains
in her introduction, in the wake of 9/11, she had difficulty continuing her twenty-year career
as a novelist so she decided to re-energize her work by reading one hundred novels to gain
fresh perspectives on her craft as a fiction writer. See id. at 3–13. Smiley’s synopses (of what
turned out to be 101 novels) range from the ancient Japanese novel, MURASAKI SHIKIBU, THE
TALE OF GENJI (Kencho Suematsu trans., Tuttle Books 2000) (1004)—about a well-born
woman describing tales of relationships between the sexes—and the twenty-first century
novel, IAN MCEWAN, ATONEMENT (2001)—about three pivotal days in an extended English
family’s life over the course of several decades of the twentieth century.
87 GRETCHEN RUBIN, FORTY WAYS TO LOOK AT WINSTON CHURCHILL: A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF
A LONG LIFE (2003).
88 Id. at 3–4.
89 Id. at 6.
90 Id. at 9.
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Variations, Wallace Steven’s “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a
Blackbird,” Kurosawa’s Rashomon, and Monet’s Haystack
and Rouen Cathedral series all demonstrate the subtleties
that emerge when a single subject is viewed under different
lights. 91
In her second biography, Forty Ways to Look at JFK, Gretchen
Rubin provides another multi-angle approach to examining the
numerous accounts of the short life of John F. Kennedy. 92 I was
captivated by her amplification of her meta-biographical technique
and her explanation of one of the key inspirations for her approach.
As Rubin explains in her introduction to the book:
I was struck by Virginia Woolf’s diary entry of November
28, 1928, in which she described her ambition for The Waves:
“I mean to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity. . . .
[sic] Waste, deadness, come from the inclusion of things that
don’t belong to the moment; this appalling narrative
business of the realist: getting on from lunch to dinner: it is
false, unreal, merely conventional.” That’s what I wanted to
accomplish: to eliminate as much as possible, to clarify what
I thought important. I wanted a way both to sweep in trifles
and to slice through the thicket of facts to make sense of
what’s known. Instead of selecting a single viewpoint—as
almost all biographers do—I wanted a structure that would
encompass multiple conclusions and would reveal the
biographer’s machinations to readers. 93
The Smiley-Rubin kaleidoscopic technique is suitable for the task
of commenting on the concurring opinion style of Judge Richard A.
Posner for three reasons. First, this approach allows legal observers
to see functional patterns in the relatively rare concurring
91 Id. at 8–9.
Among the differing ways of looking at Churchill, Rubin discusses the
following: “Churchill’s genius with words: his greatest strength”; “Churchill’s desire for fame:
his motive”; “Churchill’s disdain: his dominant quality”; “Churchill’s belligerence: his defining
characteristic”; “Churchill the painter: his favorite pastime”; “Churchill the spendthrift: a
weakness”; “Churchill’s empire: how he saw the world”; “Churchill’s imagination: how he saw
history”; and “Churchill and Hitler: nemesis.” Id. at ix–x (capitalization and italics omitted
except for proper nouns) (chapter headings in table of contents).
92 GRETCHEN RUBIN, FORTY WAYS TO LOOK AT JFK (2005).
93 Id. at 6. Among the differing ways of looking at JFK, Rubin discusses the following:
“Kennedy’s excellence: his most outstanding quality”; “Kennedy the fox: his nature”;
“Kennedy’s mystique: what made him interesting”; “Kennedy’s high ideals: what he
represented”; “Kennedy’s cool: a secret of his appeal”; “Kennedy as muse: what he inspired”;
and “who killed John F. Kennedy? The mystery of his assassination.” Id. at xi–xii
(capitalization and italics omitted except for proper nouns) (chapter headings in table of
contents).

BLOMQUIST.FINALFORPUBLISHER.DOC

56

1/16/2008 10:45:32 AM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 71

performances that Posner chooses to stage. Second, this technique
permits us a way to compare and contrast Posner’s concurring
opinion style with his dissenting opinion style, as well as his
majority opinion style. Third, this method will allow future scholars
to compare Posnerian concurring style with the concurring style of
other appellate judges.
What follows, then, consists of ten ways to look at the concurring
style of Judge Richard A. Posner: (1) as a congressional adviser, (2)
as an advocate of law and economics, (3) as an institutional critic,
(4) as a nitpicker, (5) as a weaver of hypotheticals, (6) as a bold
cutter of Gordian knots, (7) as an interpreter of statutes, (8) as a
critic of judicial standards of review, (9) as a frank commentator on
law, and (10) as a show-off during en banc appellate proceedings.
1. Posner as Congressional Adviser: Reflections of His FarReaching Intellect and Energy
Two of Judge Posner’s most distinctive and winning
characteristics are his extraordinary intellect and energy. One
manifestation of these personal qualities is his breathtaking, extrajudicial publication rate of fifty books and over four hundred law
review and academic articles. 94 Another manifestation of this
intellectual dynamism is the number and rate of his judicial opinion
Yet another materialization of this mental
production. 95
vivaciousness is the phenomenon of Posner’s memos to Congress
contained in several concurring judicial opinions. Judge Posner’s
1982 concurring opinion in United States v. Franzen was his first
Posner “th[ought] it
example of this type of concurrence. 96
unfortunate as a matter of fundamental principle” that the
appellate panel was constrained “to reverse the dismissal of the
petition for habeas corpus in this case” and wrote his concurring
opinion “to explain why [he thought] it unfortunate, in the hope that
Congress will consider reforms in the habeas corpus statute.” 97
Opining that if the court “were writing on a clean slate,” he would
94 See Blomquist, Aesthetics of Canonicity, supra note 5, at 161 n.1. For a complete list of
his publications, see Publications, Presentations and Works in Progress, University of
Chicago Law School, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r/ppw.html. (last visited
Jan. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Publications].
95 See Blomquist, Playing on Words, supra note 1, at 684–89, 733; see also Blomquist,
Aesthetics of Canonicity, supra note 5, at 162–64 (continuing a statistical overview of Judge
Posner’s work).
96 676 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., concurring).
97 Id.
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be inclined to declare that the petitioner Jones would be ineligible
under federal constitutional and statutory law to reopen his
criminal case, tried in Illinois state court, involving murders
performed by state prison inmates during the course of a prison riot
that occurred in 1965. 98 Posner was of this view because:
It is an affront to the principles both of federalism and of
rational criminal procedure for a single federal district judge
to reexamine fact findings fairly made by a state trial court
and affirmed with full opinion by the state’s highest court. It
undermines the responsibility and morale of state judges,
denies reasonable finality to criminal proceedings and
thereby undermines the legitimacy of the criminal-justice
system, imposes unduly on the time of our busy district
judges, arouses false hopes in state prisoners, and probably
does not increase the overall accuracy of constitutional
determinations. 99
But, bowing to reality, Posner acknowledged in Franzen that it
was not the case that the Seventh Circuit was writing on a clean
slate since a 1966 federal statute, 100 enacted in response to a 1963
Supreme Court decision, 101 dictated the result in the present
Cleverly, Posner went on to point out that the
case. 102
jurisprudential insistence on an expansive right of habeas corpus
review for state prisoners was “a product of its time” 103 —the
Warren Courts’ aggressive constitutionalization of state criminal
procedure coupled with “widespread skepticism” concerning the
willingness of southern states to protect the civil rights of blacks. 104
Moreover, according to Posner’s concurring opinion, “[t]imes have
changed” and more recent Supreme Court opinions had hinted at a
weakening of expansive federal habeas corpus entitlements for state
prisoners. 105 As Posner saw it, Congress gave no indication in
passing 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) that it wanted old Supreme Court
precedent on federal habeas corpus rights of state prisoners to be
frozen in time—forestalling evolving judicial reform—“but the effect
Id.
Id. at 268 (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1962–1963)).
100 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
101 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
1 (1992).
102 Franzen, 676 F.2d at 268.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
98
99
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of the statute has been to preserve as if in amber the outmoded
jurisprudence” of the Warren Court. 106 In closing his concurrence,
Posner made the following suggestion to Congress:
If I am correct that the statute has, through inadvertence,
come to have an effect different from the one it was intended
to have, then it would seem to follow that Congress should
reexamine the statute; specifically, that it should consider
amending it to provide that federal courts in habeas corpus
proceedings may not reexamine state-court factfindings
based, as in the present case, on a full and fair evidentiary
hearing. 107
In rapid succession, Judge Posner fired another statutory flare to
Congress in his concurrence in Trecker v. Scag—a 1982 securities
fraud case implicating federal securities law. 108 Posner wryly
asserts the reason for his separate concurrence from the majority
opinion which he joins “without reservations”; he “write[s]
separately only to express [his] doubts whether this case really
belongs in the federal courts.” 109 As he puts it: “I do not mean that
we do not have jurisdiction; I mean that perhaps we should not have
jurisdiction.” 110 Posner’s beef is that such a “local,” small potatoes
case—involving a Wisconsin closely held corporation with all of the
disputants save one being Wisconsin residents—should not be
taking up the valuable time and resources of United States judges;
he implies during the course of his analysis that Congress might
want to think seriously about tightening up on the jurisdictional
provisions of the federal securities statute to exclude these localized
disputes. 111 First, he opined that: “If I thought Congress really
wanted the federal courts to decide lawsuits of this sort, involving
primarily local law applied to local disputes between local residents,
Id. at 269–70.
Id. at 270. In Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring), Judge Posner wrote another opinion suggesting that Congress reform
federal habeas corpus procedures for state prisoners. At the outset of his concurrence he
observed:
I hesitate to add to the pile of opinions in this case; separate opinions are the bane of
the modern American judiciary. But the case so vividly illustrates the tenuous character
of the modern law of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, and so urgently
underscores the need for a fresh approach to the entire subject, that I cannot resist
commenting . . . .
Id.
108 679 F.2d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., concurring).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See id.
106
107
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I would bow to its desire without protest, for there is no
constitutional obstacle to federal jurisdiction.” 112 But his take on
the expansive trend of administrative rulemaking and Supreme
Court precedent since Congress passed the original securities
legislation is that federal jurisdiction has mushroomed to
encompass “a garden-variety squabble among shareholders in a
closely held corporation” with no interstate impact. 113 Second,
Posner pointed out that Rule 10b–5 “was defensible as a catch-all
prohibition of deceptive devices when the enforcement of the rule
was confined to the SEC” because of practical budget constraints
that prevented the agency “from [enforcing] anything like all the
cases that are within the potential reach of the statutes and rules
that it enforces”; but private parties have a different set of
incentives that tend to induce litigation “so long as the expected
damages exceed, however slightly, the expected cost of the litigation
to the plaintiff.” 114 Third, Posner noted that because of stare decisis
“we have and cannot renounce jurisdiction in this case, even though
our jurisdiction is the unintended result of administrative and
judicial actions that have pushed the federal courts into an area
that a proper conception of federalism would assign to state
legislatures and judges.” 115 Finally, Posner recalled plaintiff’s
counsel’s comment during oral argument that he had not brought
the Trecker suit in state court because “there were no cases under
Wisconsin’s counterpart to Rule 10b–5—all the case development
had been federal.” 116 Posner’s response to counsel’s candor was an
implicit differentiation between the expansive text of the New Deal
era federal securities statute, on the one hand, and what he viewed
as the narrower congressional intent behind the legislation: “This is
not what Congress intended to happen,” he said, “when it enacted
section 10(b) in 1934; I regret that we cannot enforce its actual
intentions.” 117
In a 1989 criminal case involving the murder of a teenage girl and
the subsequent conspiracy to kill a government witness (also a
teenage girl), United States v. D’Antoni, Judge Posner wrote a
concurring opinion to point out a flaw in the federal maximum

112
113
114
115
116
117

Id.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 712.
Id.
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sentencing statute for conspiracy. 118 According to Posner, the
statute at bar—18 U.S.C. section 371—“makes no sense.” 119 The
basic flaw was congressional inadvertence in failing to provide for a
maximum sentence for conspiracy to kill a federal witness, coupled
with an unrealistic maximum sentence of five-years incarceration
for any criminal conspiracy—no matter how heinous. 120 In light of a
number of cognate federal criminal statutes which provide
maximum sentences of ten years or more for various conspiracies
(such as a conspiracy to deprive a person of his civil rights,
conspiracy to destroy a vessel, and conspiracy to defraud the
government), “[t]here is no reason for such a low ceiling” for
conspiracy to murder a child witness in a drug prosecution. 121
Judge Posner went on to explain that such a criminal sentencing
anomaly “contributes to the randomness of federal criminal
punishment.” 122 By way of dramatic anecdote, Posner pointed out:
“The same day we heard argument in this case we heard argument
in a case where the defendant had received a fifty-year sentence for
a relatively minor drug offense.” 123 In specific advice to Congress,
Posner opines:
Congress should revise section 371 so that its maximum
penalty depends on the crime the defendants conspired to
commit. (At the same time it might wish to address another
striking deficiency in the federal criminal code—the absence
of a general attempt statute.) One way to do this would be to
make the maximum penalty for the conspiracy equal to the
maximum for the underlying crime, with perhaps a cap of
twenty years when the underlying crime is punishable by a
longer sentence, provided the conspiracy fails. There is an
argument for punishing successful conspiracies more severely
than crimes committed without conspiracy, on the ground
that a conspiracy is more dangerous than an individual
criminal. 124
In closing his criminal sentencing memorandum to Congress,
Posner observed: “The precise method of implementing the reform is
not important. The principle that criminal sentences should be
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

874 F.2d 1214, 1221 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id.
See id. at 1222.
Id. at 1221–22 (citing various maximum-sentence provisions in the federal statutes).
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id.
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related to the gravity of the criminal conduct is, and deserves
Congress’s attention.
Inadequate punishment can work a
miscarriage of justice, just as excessive punishment can.” 125
In 1990, Judge Posner offered advice to Congress to resolve a
federal securities fraud statute of limitations problem in his
concurring opinion in Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Co. 126
Posner didn’t like to have to borrow a statute of repose from another
federal securities statute to deal with the absence of an appropriate
limitations period for 10b–5 suits. 127 In colorful language, he
complained that “[b]orrowing a period of limitations from one
statute to use with another that doesn’t have its own limitations
provision is a matter of which round peg to stuff in a square
hole.” 128 In particular, in Posner’s analysis: “It artificially truncates
the court’s choice of an appropriate period, one well suited to the
particular statute under consideration. It also runs the risk of
applying one unprincipled legislative deal to a problem entirely
outside the scope of the deal.” 129 He offers an apt illustration of his
concerns:
Suppose Statute A specifies no period of limitations. Statute
B regulates analogous conduct, and has a six-month period.
But maybe B has such a short deadline for suit only because
the interest group that opposed the enactment of B had
enough muscle to block a longer deadline that would have
made more sense from a neutral standpoint. In that event,
to borrow B’s limitations period for use with A will project
the interest-group pressures that deformed B into a
completely new area of conduct.
Whether or not courts are aware of this danger, they do
attempt to correct for it by considering, as part of the
borrowing procedure, the suitability to the substantive rule
under consideration of the limitations periods in the various
candidate statutes of limitations. But this places a lot of
balls in the air. The considerations bearing on the suitability
of one limitations period compared to another include the
difficulty of investigating potential violations, the possibility
that the consequences of wrongdoing will be delayed, the

125
126
127
128
129

Id.
908 F.2d 1385, 1393 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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opportunities for wrongdoers to conceal the wrong, the rate
at which evidence of wrongdoing and also evidence pertinent
to the alleged wrongdoer’s defense is likely to decay, the
sophistication of the relevant tribunals in handling stale
evidence, the desirability of freeing court time for fresh
claims, the interest of potential defendants in repose—that
is, in knowing after a definite period has passed that they no
longer have to worry about being sued—and the effect on the
deterrence of statutory violators of reducing the time for
bringing suit. 130
Judge Posner continued his advice to Congress in Short by voicing
concern about courts applying a “standardless, discretionary
judgment: a multifactor test with no weights on the factors.” 131
Moreover, he opined that “[s]ince courts cannot be expected to
converge on a uniform outcome when they are operating under such
a standard, predicting what statute of limitations will be borrowed
is impossible and as a result extensive litigation often is necessary
before a definitive conclusion on the limitations period emerges.” 132
Posner raised, but then rejected, the idea of courts to candidly
“create statutes of limitations for claims that lack them”; 133 the
problem with this approach is the disparity that would exist in
lower court decisions on appropriate limitation periods. 134 Judge
Posner suggests that an “institutional solution is necessary” with
two possible approaches. 135
“One . . . would be for Congress to adopt a rule that every statute
shall contain a statute of limitations.” 136 To enforce such a rule
would require a congressional agency to canvass new federal
statutory enactments and point out statutes which lack
congressional limitations periods or, alternatively, to adopt a rule of
interpretation whereby “if a statute contains no period of
limitations, there . . . is no deadline on suing.” 137
Id. at 1393–94.
Id. at 1394.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1394–95.
137 Id. at 1395 (citation omitted). Posner notes in this regard:
This would cause considerable havoc but could be mitigated by a rule (well within the
power of judges to create, I believe) that, in the absence of a statutory limitations period,
the courts will apply the equitable doctrine of laches even if the cause of action is legal
rather than equitable. Then the defendant could defend by showing that the plaintiff
had unreasonably delayed in bringing the suit and that the defendant had been hurt by
130
131
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A second potential way for creating uniform limitation periods for
federal statutes which lack such periods “would be for Congress to
delegate to the Judicial Conference of the United States, or to some
new agency modeled on the Sentencing Commission . . . the power
to adopt by regulation a period of limitations for any statute that
does not have one.” 138 According to Judge Posner, “[t]his would lift
the burden from Congress of having to specify a limitations period
in every enactment and would shift it to an expert body that could
avoid the delay of litigation. It would be a great improvement over
borrowing.” 139
Another prominent example of Judge Posner deploying a
concurring judicial opinion as a policy memorandum to Congress is
his concurrence in the 2003 immigration dispute, Oforji v.
Ashcroft. 140 Indeed, at the outset of his concurring opinion, Posner
joins the majority opinion “in the main, though we interpret some of
the facts in this confusing record differently.” 141 Posner “write[s]
separately not to quibble over these differences but to invite
congressional attention to a pair of anomalies in the immigration
The first rule that he suggests Congress needs to
laws.” 142
reconsider is the flat ten-year period for an alien living in the
United States to plead hardship to her children (born in the United
States and, therefore, American citizens) as a basis for suspension
of the parent’s deportation proceeding. 143 Judge Posner’s rationale
on this point is as follows:
[The ten-year] rule has only a tenuous relation to the
hardship of children whose parent is ordered deported. What
is true is that the longer the children have lived in the
United States, the greater the hardship to them of being sent
back to their parent’s native country—one of the
unappetizing choices facing these children and a choice made
more excruciating the longer they remain here and become
acclimated to American ways. But the length of time a child
has lived in the United States depends on when she was born
as well as on when her parents came to the United States.
the delay.
Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 354 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 620.
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The parent may have been here for ten years but the child
[may] have been born six months ago; or the parent may
have been here for nine years but the child [may] have been
born eight years ago. The [ten-year- flat period] rule is
irrational [when] viewed as a device for identifying those
cases in which the hardship to an alien’s children should
weigh against forcing her to leave the country. 144
A second immigration rule which Posner suggests Congress
should rethink is the absolute “awarding of citizenship to everyone
born in the United States,” with a few exceptions for cases involving
of children of foreign officials. 145 Although potentially anchored in
the language of “section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Judge
Posner believes that the real problem is a statutory one since Title 8
of the United States Code dictates the automatic citizenship
approach for all children born in America—regardless of the
circumstances. 146 Posner is concerned about abuses that such a
bright line rule fosters—such as the tens of thousands of babies
born in the United States every year to “illegal immigrants and
others who come here to give birth so their children will be
American citizens.” 147 According to his reasoning, “[w]e should not
be encouraging foreigners to come to the United States solely to
enable them to confer U.S. citizenship on their future children.” 148
2. Posner as Advocate of Law and Economics: His Leitmotif
A recurrent theme running through the scholarly and judicial
work product of Richard A. Posner is his discussion of economic
principles applied to the myriad of problems in the law. Indeed,
Posner is viewed by many as the founder of the Field of Law and
Economics. So it is not surprising that Judge Posner has chosen to
utilize his concurring and majority opinions as occasions for
emphasizing how (in his view) economics can clarify and elucidate
the best way to resolve legal issues. Early in his tenure on the
federal appellate bench, Posner offered numerous Law and
Economics concurring opinions. For example, in the 1983 case of
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Chicago Area v. Kempiners, Posner
joined the per curiam opinion which vacated the district court’s
144
145
146
147
148

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 620–21 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2000)).
Id. at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Id.
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ruling in favor of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim for the taking of
additional evidence on the issue of standing; he wrote separately to
examine Planned Parenthood’s economic stake in the litigation. 149
The Illinois statute at issue “creates a program for state funding of
organizations that offer assistance in problem pregnancies, provided
the organization does not refer or counsel for abortion.” 150 The nub
of Judge Posner’s concurrence addressed the probability of Planned
Parenthood receiving money from the state program:
Planned Parenthood has standing to challenge [the
statutory] proviso if there is a reasonable probability that
striking it down would result in a tangible benefit to Planned
Parenthood: namely, receiving money under the program. I
do not think Planned Parenthood has to show that it will be
certain to receive money if the proviso is struck down; but if
that is only a remote possibility, Planned Parenthood’s
tangible stake in the outcome of this lawsuit is too slight to
give it standing. 151
Unfortunately, the remainder of his concurring opinion is
rambling and incomprehensible on the issue of standing because of
the speculative and incoherent musings that Judge Posner indulges
in for the purpose of guessing why the plaintiff delayed in applying
for a state grant. 152 Posner’s concurring opinion in another 1983
case, St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 153 also falls
short of providing economic analysis which illuminates the federal
income tax issues at bar. Instead, Posner’s riffs on “the economics
of the family” and the ways that “[a] housewife contributes to the
wealth of the family by freeing up, for the production of additional
market income, time that the husband would otherwise have to
devote to household work,” come across as more exhibitionist and
extravagant than analytically useful. 154
700 F.2d 1115, 1135 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curium) (Posner, J., writing separately).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111 ½, §§ 4601–
100 (current version at Problem Pregnancy Health Services and Care Act, 410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 230/4–102 (West 2007))).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1136–37.
153 716 F.2d 1180, 1186 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring).
154 Id. at 1187.
For another example of an extravagant, turgid “Law and Economics”
analysis, see Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1189 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
If such [sexual] harassment is rampant, the city will have to pay higher wages to attract
female employees. It is unlikely to reap an offsetting gain in lower wages for male
employees who obtain along with their jobs a license as it were to harass female workers.
Many, perhaps most, men don’t want such a license; and among those who do, still most
149
150
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In contradistinction, Judge Posner’s Law and Economics analysis
concurrence of why it made sense to award costs to the government
defendants in an unfounded lawsuit brought by neighbors who were
upset about a Department of Housing and Urban Development
property which had become vacant and allegedly derelict, was
forceful and compelling. 155 As eloquently expressed by Posner:
[A] factor that the plaintiffs ask us to consider is whether,
if they had won the case, it would have been a “landmark”
decision; they argue that the efforts of litigants who press for
fundamental changes in the law should be subsidized, lest
the high risk of losing deter such litigants. I question the
validity of this argument in today’s legal climate. The
federal courts are choking with litigation, much of it
completely meritless; fear of losing seems not to be much of a
deterrent. And to reward the loser of what would have been
a landmark case if he had won creates the following paradox:
the more frivolous the suit, the greater the landmark it
would establish in the unlikely event that it succeeded, and
hence the stronger the argument for denying the winner his
costs. A successful suit to overrule Brown v. Board of
Education and thus make racial segregation in public schools
once again lawful, would be one of the all-time legal
landmarks. No one takes the landmark argument for
forgiving the loser’s costs that seriously; no one argues for
interpreting Rule 54(d) to encourage the bringing of lawsuits
that have no reasonable chance of succeeding, merely
because if they did succeed they would work a legal
revolution. The present lawsuit had no reasonable chance of
succeeding, and in fact borders on the frivolous. 156
The above-mentioned quotation from Posner’s Burroughs
concurrence is winning because it is cast in terms that everyone can
understand and it utilizes an example that powerfully illustrates
the operation of the economic principles involved in deciding
whether or not to award costs against the losing plaintiff. Another
example of a practical take on economic issues is found in Judge
Posner’s concurring opinion in Jones v. Miller; 157 in that
don’t value it as much as women disvalue being harassed. More important, the
productivity of both male and female employees must suffer if harassment is common.
Id. at 1192.
155 Burroughs v. Hills, 741 F.2d 1525, 1537 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 1538 (citation omitted).
157 768 F.2d 923, 930 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring).
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concurrence, Posner gives commonsense advice to district judges for
issuing opinions in bankruptcy cases by suggesting that the busy
judges decide cases by tentative oral opinions, followed by a review
of the transcript for necessary polishing, citations, and
amplification. 158
Judge Posner’s 1987 concurring opinion in Chicago Board of
Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago is valuable because it explains,
through straightforward economic analysis, how the ostensible
“health, safety, and welfare” purposes for the regulation of
residential leases are disingenuous at best and a sham at worse. 159
Posner explains that by “requir[ing] the payment of interest on
security deposits; requir[ing] that those deposits be held in Illinois
bank;” allowing tenants to withhold rent for some reasons;
permitting tenants “to make minor repairs and subtract the
reasonable cost of the repair from their rent;” and regulating the
late charges landlords can charge tenants, among other changes,
the City of Chicago’s new residential lease ordinance will have the
perverse effect of undermining the quantity and quality of the
housing stock available to renters. 160 As Posner put it, “[f]orbidding
landlords to charge interest at market rates on late payment of rent
could hardly be thought [of as] calculated to improve the health,
safety, and welfare of Chicagoans” and, indeed, “may have the
opposite effect.” 161 The likely consequences of this part of the
ordinance are easy to envision in the simply stated language
deployed by Judge Posner:
The initial consequences of the rule will be to reduce the
resources that landlords devote to improving the quality of
housing, by making the provision of rental housing more
costly. Landlords will try to offset the higher cost (in time
value of money, less predictable cash flow, and, probably,
higher rate of default) by raising rents. To the extent they
succeed, tenants will be worse off, or at least no better off.
Landlords will also screen applicants more carefully, because
the cost of renting to a deadbeat will now be higher; so
marginal tenants will find it harder to persuade landlords to
rent to them. Those who do find apartments but then are
slow to pay will be subsidized by responsible tenants . . . who
158
159
160
161

Id. at 932.
819 F.2d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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will be paying higher rents, assuming the landlord cannot
determine in advance who is likely to pay rent on time.
Insofar as these efforts to offset the ordinance fail, the cost of
rental housing will be higher to landlords and therefore less
will be supplied—more of the existing stock than would
otherwise be the case will be converted to condominia and
cooperatives and less rental housing will be built. 162
Judge Posner should have quit his economic analysis of the
Chicago rental ordinance while he was ahead. After all, he was
concurring with the majority opinion which had affirmed the
district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction sought by Chicago
landlords because the ordinance did not violate any federal
Judge Posner’s extended economic
constitutional standard. 163
diatribe (with a parade of economic horribles surmised without
substantial economic evidence) goes over the line of reasonable
concurrence and takes on the form of an ideological libertarian
manifesto. 164
In his concurring opinion in the 1990 case, United States v.
McKinney, 165 Judge Posner offered some pithy observations on “the
standard for reviewing determinations of probable cause” in
criminal cases by lower court judges. 166 In the first place, he
likened a judicial probable cause determination in a criminal
proceeding to a “finding of negligence in an ordinary tort suit,”
concluding that both types of judicial findings involve “the
application of the legal standard to the facts of the particular

Id.
Id. at 734–37, 740–41 (majority opinion).
164 The following economic analysis in Judge Posner’s concurring opinion is unpersuasive
because it is not rooted in reasonable inferences but sounds arrogant and ideological:
The ordinance is not in the interest of poor people. As is frequently the case with
legislation ostensibly designed to promote the welfare of the poor, the principal
beneficiaries will be middle-class people. They will be people who buy rather than rent
housing (the conversion of rental to owner housing will reduce the price of the latter by
increasing its supply); people willing to pay a higher rental for better-quality housing;
and (a largely overlapping group) more affluent tenants, who will become more attractive
to landlords because such tenants are less likely to be late with the rent or to abuse the
right of withholding rent—a right that is more attractive, the poorer the tenant. The
losers from the ordinance will be some landlords, some out-of-state banks, the poorest
class of tenants, and future tenants. The landlords are few in number (once owneroccupied rental housing is excluded—and the ordinance excludes it). Out-of-staters can’t
vote in Chicago elections. Poor people in our society don’t vote as often as the affluent.
Id. at 742 (Posner, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
165 919 F.2d 405, 418 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring), abrogated by United States v.
Spears, 965 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1992).
166 Id.
162
163
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case.” 167 In Posner’s view, “appellate review of the application of
law to fact should be deferential.” 168 In the second place, he
employed forceful Law and Economics methodology to show how a
lower court finding of probable cause and a lower court finding of
negligence are bottomed on an identical kind of judgment:
Both negligence and probable cause require a judgment of
reasonableness that is made after balancing costs and
benefits (the costs of care and the benefits of accident
avoidance in the negligence case, and the costs of getting
evidence of criminal guilt by other means and the benefits in
protecting privacy in the probable-cause case) and is based
explicitly on probabilities (the probability of an accident in
the negligence case and the probability that a search will
turn up evidence of crime in the probable-cause case). 169
Several years later in his 2001 concurrence in Great Lakes
Warehouse v. NLRB, Posner utilized economic exegesis to untangle
some knotty principles of federal labor law. 170 He urged the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or a future reviewing court
“in an appropriate case, which this is not” to amplify and rethink
the “conventional principle that offering a promotion is one method
of interfering with a union organizing campaign” and “the equally
conventional principle that failure to impose discipline uniformly
can be evidence of discrimination against a union supporter.” 171
Deploying the effective tropes of a “carrot” and a “stick,” Judge
Posner sought to illuminate the questions. First, regarding a
“carrot,” he wrote:
The idea that the carrot is as potent as the stick, and
therefore that it is as “coercive” to offer a union supporter a
promotion to management as it is to fire him, is unsound.
Most workers welcome a promotion, and so a company that
has a practice of promoting union supporters to get them out
of the bargaining unit, the group of workers that vote on
whether to unionize the unit, will actually increase the
expected income of being a union supporter. The more eager
the company is to buy off union supporters, the more union
supporters there will be. So likely, therefore, is such a tactic

167
168
169
170
171

Id. at 419.
Id.
Id. at 419–20 (citation omitted).
239 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 892.
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of discouraging unionization to backfire that the Board
should hesitate to infer such a motive from the offer of
promotion. 172
Second, regarding a “stick,” Posner opined:
[One of the litigants] received the stick, not the carrot; but
the use of evidence of nonuniformity in the imposition of
discipline to support an inference [of] discrimination has a
downside that, again, [is not adequately] recognize[d]. If a
company risks legal trouble by exercising lenience in the
enforcement of its work rules, it will have an incentive to
enforce those rules in a uniform and therefore harsh manner.
Lenience will be out. Workers as a whole may suffer. It does
not follow that evidence of discriminatory enforcement
should be inadmissible, because having strict rules on
attendance or performance but enforcing them only against
union supporters would be a potent method of discouraging
unionization. But the downside [of] this type of evidence
that I have pointed to is an argument for the Board’s
resolving
close
cases
against
an
inference
of
discrimination. 173
Judge Posner also brought a judicious blend of Law and
Economics perspectives to his 2002 concurring opinion in Schroeder
v. Hamilton School District, which agreed with the majority that a
former public school teacher did not present a material issue of fact
sufficient to avoid a summary judgment in the school’s favor on a
Section 1983 claim (which alleged that he was denied equal
protection by the school’s failure to take effective steps to prevent
him from being harassed on account of his same-sex orientation). 174
Posner chose to write separately in the case to emphasize that the
result would be the same even if the teacher was able to prove that
the school administration’s “response to his complaints about the
harassment to which he was subjected was tepid in comparison to
[the] response to [the] signs of racial prejudice” at the school. 175 He
highlighted four key economic considerations in his concurrence in
Schroeder—all of which supported his startling claim that “[t]he
administration of the public schools of this country in the current
climate of rancid identity politics, pervasive challenges to authority,
172
173
174
175

Id.
Id.
282 F.3d 946, 956 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id.
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and mounting litigiousness is an undertaking at once daunting and
thankless.” 176 First, Judge Posner noted that “it is not irrational to
prioritize protective activities. It is in fact unavoidable, because of
limitations of time and (other) resources.” 177 In Posner’s view: “If
race relations are a particularly sensitive area in a particular
school, the school authorities are not irrational in deciding to devote
more time and effort to defusing racial tensions than to preventing
harassment of a homosexual (or overweight, or undersized, or
nerdish, or homely) teacher.” 178 Second, examining the economics of
unknown harassment, Posner wrote that “when most of the abuse
directed at a person is anonymous,” as it was in the case at bar, “the
school authorities may be unable to prevent it without a
disproportionate commitment of resources to the effort or a
disproportionate curtailment of student rights.” 179 Third, Judge
Posner emphasized the logic of school administrator’s “reticence
about flagging issues of sex for children” based on the following
legitimate educational concerns: “[I]t is possible for a rational school
administration to fear that if it explains sexual phenomena,
including homosexuality, to schoolchildren in an effort to get them
to understand that it is wrong to abuse homosexuals, it will make
children prematurely preoccupied with issues of sexuality.” 180
Again, elaborating on a theme of rational cost-benefit calculation for
school officials, Posner stated a fourth economic consideration that
supported judicially denying the plaintiff’s legal claim:
[I]t is a mistake automatically to equate favoritism to
discrimination. The difference is that while discrimination
against a group harms the group, favoritism for another
group may not harm the nonfavored group, or may harm it
too slightly for the law to take notice. Even if the school
authorities had no good reason to be as solicitous of the
welfare of their black and female students as they were, it

Id. at 959.
Id. at 958 (citations omitted).
178 Id. Judge Posner added the following additional analysis to this first point:
It is true that the out-of-pocket costs of some additional measures that the [school]
might have taken, for example adding to every memo warning against discrimination on
grounds of race the words “or sexual orientation,” would have been slight. But such an
addition would have a negligible effect without amplification—except perhaps to dilute
the warning against racial discrimination. The more amplification, moreover, the greater
the dilution—which shows that the measure would not have been costless after all.
Id. (emphasis added).
179 Id.
180 Id.
176
177
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would not follow that, had they been less solicitous of them,
Schroeder would have benefited; and, if not, how was he
hurt? 181
Judge Posner ended his Schroeder concurring opinion with a bold
bow of political philosophy, managing to tie together his Law and
Economics reasoning into a well-wrapped conclusion:
We judges should not make [the administration of the public
schools] even more daunting [than it already is] by injecting
our own social and educational values in the name of
“rationality review”. So while in hindsight it appears that
the defendants could have done more to protect Schroeder
from abuse, it is equally important to emphasize that
lackluster is not a synonym for invidious or irrational. There
is no evidence that the defendants were hostile to Schroeder
because of his sexual orientation—or because of anything
else, for that matter. And they cannot be said to have been
irrational in failing to do more than they did, as there were
rational considerations counseling against more vigorous
action. 182
3. Posner the Institutional Critic: His Concern with Core
Competencies, Boundaries, and Purposes
Another way to look at the concurring judicial opinions of Judge
Richard A. Posner is to consider those concurrences which have
emphasized institutional considerations. In this regard, Posner is
adept at understanding the legal process dimensions of the
American system of making and applying law in numerous
instantiations of organizations. 183 He has an uncanny ability to
fathom the appropriate boundaries of judicial intervention and
management of public policy problems, on the one hand, while
understanding the proper role of other institutions, on the other
hand. An early example of Posner’s use of the concurrence as a
method of institutional critique is his 1983 concurring opinion in

Id.
Id. at 959.
183 The classic American legal book on the importance of law and institutions is HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (tent. ed. 1958).
For an extended discussion of institutional factors that bear on American legislatures, see
Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process Perspectives and
Possibilities, 38 AKRON L. REV. 895 (2005).
181
182
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Gautreaux v. Pierce. 184 Judge Posner strongly preferred a different
theory than the majority opinion, 185 which affirmed the district
court’s factual finding that the so-called Academy Square housing
project, approved by the Federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), was in the “best interest[] of the community”—
the standard earlier set in the complex litigation by a consent
decree. 186 Posner had a serious problem with the justiciability,
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, of a federal district judge
passing on the essentially political issue of whether or not a fifteen
percent ceiling of public housing units in a census tract on the Near
West Side of Chicago could be exceeded if “HUD shows to the court’s
satisfaction that the project is in the best interests of the
community where the assisted housing would be located.” 187
Initially, he pointed out that for a trial judge’s decision “to be
judicial in character, the standard for decision must be definite
enough to allow a reasoned judgment, as distinct from a political
judgment such as a legislative or administrative body might
make.” 188 Next, in a fascinating meditation on the “best interests of
the community” standard in the consent decree in the case at bar
compared with other judicial best interest standards, he concluded
that these other standards were established by Congress (in
contrast to the consent decree), could be given meaning by the
context of the statutory language (in contrast to the consent decree),
and usually focused on a particular individual (in contrast to the
consent decree specifying a “community” which “is an aggregation of
individuals having different, and in this case warring, interests”). 189
In a related insight, Posner opined that “[i]f the parties to the
decree wanted someone to make a best interests of the community
determination, as evidently they did, they should have appointed an
arbitrator.” 190 At this point in his concurring opinion, Judge Posner
noted that there were analogous situations when judges would not
set unspecified terms in an agreement:
A court will not enforce an ordinary contract that is
indefinite—a contract that does not specify a price, for
707 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring).
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text for this reason for writing an appellate
concurring opinion, among other reasons.
186 Gautreaux, 707 F.2d at 269 (majority opinion).
187 Id. at 270 (Posner, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 270–71.
190 Id. at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 183,
at 306–30 (discussing arbitration).
184
185
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example (unless it appears that the parties meant the price
to be the market price or some other readily ascertainable
standard of value). . . . When courts do in effect fix a price—
when they fix the reasonable “price” of life and limb in
awarding damages in personal-injury cases, for example—
they do so in accordance with objective standards, which are
lacking here. If courts will not let contracting parties
delegate to them the function of setting essential terms of the
contract, no more should they agree to play city planner just
because the parties would like them to. 191
Posner was not persuaded by the evidence of best interest of the
community relied upon by the majority opinion (noting “[t]he
various shards of evidence on which my brethren rely seem to me
unpersuasive singly and in combination”). 192 But, shifting ground,
he argued that the district court’s order should be affirmed since the
appellants in the present case lacked standing because they were
“neither parties to the decree nor third-party beneficiaries” to the
decree. 193 To allow these appellants to challenge the consent decree
would, in Posner’s colorful turn of phrase, “turn every consent
decree into a statute.” 194 Thus:
If a seller of bakery products sued a competitor for predatory
pricing, and they entered into a consent settlement that the
court approved and embodied in a consent decree forbidding
the defendant to sell its bakery products below cost, no other
sellers of bakery products besides the plaintiff could later
intervene to enforce the consent decree because they thought
the defendant was hurting them by selling below cost. The
consent decree would not be a privately enforceable statute
limiting the defendant’s pricing freedom; it would be a source
of enforceable rights only to the plaintiff. Similarly, the
lawsuit that the consent decree in this case settled was
brought by black people complaining of segregated public
housing, and the decree was for their benefit. No one else
has a legally enforceable right to block the project in the
name of the decree. 195
Posner’s institutional critique in his 1982 concurrence in Trecker

191
192
193
194
195

Gautreaux, 707 F.2d at 271 (Posner, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id. at 273 (citation omitted).
Id.
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v. Scag 196 was premised not on the core competency of federal courts
in resolving judicial types of disputes, as was his concern in
Gautreaux, 197 but on the institutional purpose that Congress had in
mind in enacting the federal securities statute in 1934. In Trecker,
Posner could not believe that Congress wanted federal courts to
exercise “federal jurisdiction in a case [which was] a garden-variety
squabble among shareholders in a closely held corporation, which
could not even be maintained as a diversity action because of the
lack of complete diversity among the parties.” 198
Judge Posner spoke to the institutional concerns of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in his concurrence in the 1983 en
banc case of Egger v. Phillips. 199 Egger involved a former FBI agent
who brought suit against his former superior seeking damages
based on allegations that his transfer from an FBI field office in
Indianapolis to Chicago and his subsequent discharge for failure to
report to his new duty station was in violation of his constitutional
rights. 200 Posner agreed that the ex-FBI agent could not sue his
former supervisor for money damages for institutional reasons: “I
am not convinced,” he wrote, “that this case should be decided
differently [from a previous Seventh Circuit decision which
disallowed a suit for money damages sought by members of an army
reserve unit for their transfer to another unit]”; 201 this was because
“of the potential disruptive effect of damages liability on the FBI’s
ability to maintain discipline and cohesion.” 202
In his 1984 concurrence in Burroughs v. Hills, Judge Posner
wrote separately to emphasize the important boundary issue that
the loser of a federal lawsuit should be responsible for paying
costs. 203 His 1985 concurring opinion in United States v. OCCI Co.
focused on the institutional nature of HUD’s decision to foreclose on
a commercial mortgage; 204 such a decision, according to Posner,
should not be subject to judicial review because of the lack of any
196 679 F.2d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., concurring). For a discussion of Posner’s
concurrence in Trecker v. Scag as an example of his concurring opinions providing advice to
Congress, see supra notes 108–17 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 184–195 and accompanying text.
198 Trecker, 679 F.2d at 710–11.
199 710 F.2d 292, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring).
200 Id. at 294.
201 Id. at 325.
202 Id.
203 741 F.2d 1525, 1537 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring).
For a discussion of
Posner’s concurrence in Burroughs as an example of Law and Economics reasoning, see supra
notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
204 758 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring).
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meaningful standard to apply and because:
The decision to foreclose on a commercial mortgage [by HUD]
rather than give the mortgagor more time, like the decision
how much rent to charge for an apartment, is a managerial
and business rather than legal judgment. It has to be made
and implemented quickly in order to be effective, and courts
can do little to improve it . . . . 205
Judge Posner’s concurrence in another 1985 case, Gotches v.
Heckler, 206 like his concurring opinion in OCCI, 207 focused on
administrative efficiency and efficacy as worthy institutional
goals. 208 Gotches involved a class action claim of a widow of a
retired railroad worker who had been receiving both railroad
retirement and social security benefits prior to his death. 209 The
railroad worker’s widow, through her attorney, sought to effect
changes in the government’s award of benefits to surviving widows
in similar cases throughout the country. 210 The government delayed
for about six months in signing a consent decree in the class action
and the widow’s attorney sought the award of his attorney’s fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 211 While Posner agreed with
the majority opinion—which remanded computation of the attorney
fees based on a reasonable calculation of the benefits he had
obtained for Mrs. Gotches but not for his fees in negotiating a
consent decree which covered generic cases 212 —he was disturbed by
“some of its reasoning and about . . . the opinion’s unduly harsh tone
of criticism of the government.” 213
Posner considered the
institutional dynamics of government review of administrative
policy change to be a vital government interest which should be
respected by the judiciary and given a wide berth:
When the federal government is confronted by a demand
to make far-reaching changes in the administration of major
programs, under the supervision of a federal judge, the
public interest is disserved if the government simply caves in
and signs a consent decree drafted by the plaintiffs’ counsel,

205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Id. at 1167 (emphasis added).
773 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring).
See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
Gotches, 773 F.3d at 112–15 (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 109–10 (majority opinion).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 109–12 (citing Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)).
Id. at 112.
Id. at 112 (Posner, J., concurring).
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without careful consideration of the costs, consequences, and
ramifications. Government by judicial decree is not yet the
norm in this country, and a public agency does neither the
courts nor the taxpaying public a favor when it consents too
readily to the entry of a far-reaching decree curtailing its
freedom of action. It was prudent for the government to take
several months to consider and negotiate over the plaintiffs’
proposals. 214
Judge Posner’s 1988 concurring opinion in Archie v. City of
Racine, an en banc rehearing by the full Seventh Circuit, returned
his institutional gaze to concerns about the proper “allocation of
governmental responsibilities between the states and the federal
government.” 215 The case involved a Section 1983 civil rights action
which arose out of a local fire department dispatcher’s failure to
provide rescue services as requested by a black woman who died
shortly thereafter. 216 The majority opinion determined that the
dispatcher had violated no constitutional rights of the deceased
woman and, therefore, the administrator of her estate and her
surviving children had no cause of action. 217 Posner chose to “write
separately to propose a slightly different though consistent view of
the case.” 218 At the start of his concurrence Posner sympathized
with the “victims in these failure-to-rescue cases [who, like the
decedent in this matter] appear to be drawn disproportionately from
marginal segments of the community, where the ordinary political
pressures for effective provision of public reserve services may be
In addition, he conceded that given the
attenuated.” 219
“plastic . . . language of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, at least when viewed against the ambiguous history of
the term ‘due process’”; he concluded “that a respectable textual
argument can be made in favor of the proposition that [the
dispatcher] deprived [the caller] either of her property or her life
without due process of law.” 220 However, Judge Posner opined that
he “[n]evertheless . . . agree[d] that the plaintiffs in the present case
must lose.” 221 Thus, in a constitutional sense, even a grossly

214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

Id. at 114 (citation omitted).
847 F.2d 1211, 1224, 1226 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 1213–14 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1224 (Posner, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
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negligent course of action by the dispatcher, under the
circumstances in the record, did not rise to the level of intentional or
reckless culpability; 222 moreover, Posner was alarmed at the
potential for federal causes of action to displace state courts in the
business of adjudicating contract and tort law disputes:
The combination of the procedural innovations that have
in the last quarter century revitalized 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the
main vehicle for constitutional tort litigation), with the
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment that in the
same period have vastly expanded the amendment’s
substantive and procedural limitations upon state action,
threaten between them to transfer almost the whole of public
contract law and public-employee tort law from the state
courts to the federal courts. Not only are the federal courts
unprepared for such an influx of litigation, but the
transference would be inconsistent with a rational allocation
of governmental responsibilities between the states and the
federal government. The Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts have therefore attempted to come up with
limiting principles, and while the scope of those principles is
not entirely clear . . . they appear to defeat the effort by the
plaintiffs in this case to demonstrate either a deprivation of
property or a deprivation of life. 223
As we have seen, Judge Posner’s concurring opinion in United
States v. McKinney can be primarily appreciated under the rubric of
his penchant for economic analysis of law. 224 Yet, Posner added to
his hallmark economic approach with an institutional analysis in
McKinney, noting in this regard “the nature of the issue to be
reviewed in relation to the comparative institutional advantages of
trial and reviewing courts, and other pertinent practical
considerations, rather than the words in which standards of
appellate review are formulated, should . . . determine the scope of
review.” 225
Judge Posner’s 2001 concurring opinion in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. is an
illustration of his turning the light of his exploration of institutional

Id. at 1226.
Id.
224 See supra Part III.B.2.
225 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasis added to the first
phrase).
222
223
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factors inward on the workings of his own United States Circuit
Court of Appeals. 226 The Seventh Circuit was rehearing the case en
banc; the gravaman of the dispute was the admissibility and
relevance of the collective bargaining agreement as it bore on the
discipline of an employee who had engaged in sexually offensive
conduct resulting in alleged harassment of women employees. 227
While Posner agreed with the full court that “the panel erred in
ordering a new trial on liability,” he objected to the en banc review
of the panel decision. 228 He complained:
But we do not take cases en banc merely because of
disagreement with a panel’s decision, or rather a piece of a
decision, least of all a piece of a decision concerning the
relevance of a particular item of evidence to a particular
issue in a particular case. We take cases en banc to answer
questions of general importance likely to recur, or to resolve
intracircuit conflicts, or to address issues of transcendent
public significance—perhaps even to curb a “runaway”
panel—but not just to review a panel opinion for error, even
in cases . . . in which sexual harassment is charged. 229
Judge Posner noted that “such [en banc] determination is”
improper because “[t]he questions” regarding the relevance of a
company’s collective bargaining agreement with a union to a federal
sexual harassment claim “have not arisen in any other reported
case, and for all I know may never arise,” and because the trial
court’s exclusion of the collective bargaining agreement evidence
was “harmless,” the “grant of rehearing en banc was gratuitous as
well as premature.” 230 He added:
And it was premature not only in the sense that there was no
need to answer the questions yet, but also because, as a
consequence of there being no other cases, we lack an
adequate basis in experience for answering general questions
about relevance; we lack sufficient particulars to be able to
generalize intelligently. 231
256 F.3d 516, 529 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 519 (majority opinion).
228 Id. at 529 (Posner, J., concurring).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. He continued in this vein:
It might well be thought foolhardy to lay down a blanket rule, not justified by
considerations of privilege, that an entire class of evidence is “irrelevant,” and therefore
inadmissible, in a broad class of cases having, potentially at least, diverse facts, without
some sense of what those facts might be. A narrower rule might be unexceptionable.
226
227
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4. Posner as Nitpicker: Two Views
a. Posner is a Nitpicker
To nitpick is to “find fault in a petty manner,” to quibble in one’s
criticism of others. 232
Ample evidence exists to support the
proposition that Judge Posner frequently exhibits nitpicking
tendencies when he writes concurring judicial opinions.
Item #1: His concurrence in Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Chicago
Area v. Kempiners which engages in tedious speculation over the
standing of the plaintiff organization to challenge the
constitutionality of an Illinois statute that provided “state funding
of organizations that offer assistance in problem pregnancies,
provided the organization does not refer or counsel for abortion.” 233
In cryptic—and ultimately trivial—language, Posner pontificates as
follows:
Planned Parenthood has standing to challenge this
[statutory] proviso if there is a reasonable probability that
striking it down would result in a tangible benefit to Planned
Parenthood: namely, receiving money under the program. I
do not think Planned Parenthood has to show that it will be
certain to receive money if the proviso is struck down; but if
that is only a remote possibility, Planned Parenthood’s
tangible stake in the outcome of this lawsuit is too slight to
give it standing. 234
So, Posner’s quibble in Planned Parenthood resulted in a remand
to the district court judge to conduct “an evidentiary hearing to
explore the questions of standing raised in [his] separate
opinion.” 235
Item #2: Posner’s concurrence to the en banc decision in Parisie v.
Greer, which is unnecessary prolix, adds to the multiplicity of
separate opinions, and is gratuitously petty in addressing the
merits of the appeal with the following off-handed remarks:
Turning, finally, to the merits of the appeal, I cannot
agree that the appellant is entitled to a new trial so that he
Id. at 530.
232 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 1007 (Am. ed. 1996).
233 700 F.2d 1115, 1135 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted).
234 Id.
235 Id. at 1116 (per curiam).
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can introduce evidence that his murder victim was a
homosexual . . . . Parisie wants the evidence admitted in
order to bolster his defense of “homosexual panic,” which is
the idea that a latent homosexual—and manifest
“homophobe”—can be so upset by a homosexual’s advances to
him that he becomes temporarily insane, in which state he
may kill the homosexual. It is no business of mine whether
the State of Illinois chooses to recognize a defense of
“homosexual panic” as a subcategory of the insanity defense,
but I cannot believe that the Constitution of the United
States requires a state to allow defense counsel in a murder
case to defame the murderer’s victim as a homosexual
without satisfying the normal prerequisite to admitting
evidence of reputation—that the evidence be based upon
contact with the subject’s neighbors and associates rather
than upon the personal opinion of the witness. 236
Item #3: Posner’s concurring opinion in Piper Aircraft Corp. v.
Wag-Aero, Inc., a trademark infringement case, which goes on and
on to muse on the unimportant issue of whether or not a trial court’s
determination of laches ought to be treated as a discretionary
judgment of the trial court which should be subject to reversal on
appeal “only for a clear abuse of discretion.” 237 It is chock full of
string citations, 238 it is aridly academic in tone and substance, 239
and it indulges in digressions from digressions. 240
Item #4: The Posnerian concurrence in Moore v. Marketplace
Restaurant, Inc., agreeing with the affirmance, in part, and
reversal, in part, of a Section 1983 action which was brought by
individuals who were allegedly unlawfully arrested and imprisoned
236 705 F.2d 882, 893 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citations omitted).
237 741 F.2d 925, 935 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
238 See, e.g., id. at 936.
239 See, e.g., id. at 938 (“If I am right that the determination of laches ought not be treated
as a discretionary judgment of the trial court, then how has the ‘abuse of discretion’
formulation become so entrenched? The answer seems to be historical; the phrase is a fossil
of legal paleontology.”).
240 See, e.g., id. at 939.
The time when equity relief really was discretionary—a judgment committed to the
conscience of the chancellor—is past, the law of equity having long ago crystallized in a
system of rules similar in basic character to the rules of the common law, though
perhaps marginally more flexible. See the splendid discussion of the origins of equity in
[string citations to various works of legal history]. (But what could be more flexible than
the concept of “due care” which underlies negligence law?).
Id. (citations omitted).
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on charges of theft of services from a restaurant. 241 The concurring
opinion creates more confusion than light; especially given the
remand of a significant part of the litigation to the lower court for
jury trial. 242 Moreover, the entire dispute was of a rather trivial
nature, involving a group of out-of-towners who stopped at a
restaurant and were so displeased with the service that they left
without paying—ultimately to be arrested at the campground they
were staying, and put in an unpleasant holding cell for several
hours. 243 Why did Judge Posner find it appropriate to write a
separate opinion from the straightforward majority opinion, and to
quibble on nearly every issue in the case as if he were a first year
law student writing the answer to a criminal law exam?
Item #5: In a concurring opinion to Phelps v. Duckworth, an en
banc reversal of a panel opinion’s approval of a district court’s grant
of habeas corpus relief, Posner led off his opinion with a frank
admission: “I hesitate to add to the pile of opinions in this case;
separate opinions are the bane of the modern American
judiciary.” 244 This (almost humorous) statement is immediately
followed by another observation that dissuades a reader from even
bothering to go to the trouble of reading the concurrence:
But the case so vividly illustrates the tenuous character of
the modern law of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners,
and so urgently underscores the need for a fresh approach to
the entire subject, that I cannot resist commenting briefly
(too briefly to do full justice to an immensely complex area)
on what that approach might be, though I am mindful that
judges at our level are not empowered to adopt it. 245
And when one goes to the trouble of reading Judge Posner’s
concurring opinion in Phelps, it tends to repeat many points made
in yet another concurrence by Judge Easterbrook, it is thick with
dense legal historical points of questionable import, and it comes off
as carping and niggling in complaining at its conclusion:
I look forward to the day when the Supreme Court will
simplify constitutional criminal procedure and allow us to
decide cases such as this on common-sense grounds, rather
than making us dance an elaborate quadrille that finds us

241
242
243
244
245

754 F.2d 1336, 1338–39, 1356 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1340–41.
772 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id.
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however in the same place when the music stops—with a
conclusion that the defendant is not in custody in violation of
the Constitution. 246
There are numerous additional caviling concurring moments in
Judge Posner’s judicial oeuvre including: wailing about the longstanding Supreme Court gloss on Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of
the United States Constitution—the Contract Clause—and
characterizing the Supreme Court’s interpretations as “defang[ing]
the [C]ontract [C]lause”; 247 niggling over the differing abstract
considerations for judicial modification of institutional reform
consent decrees, on the one hand, and private property consent
decrees, on the other hand; 248 a rambling rant about the artistic and
expressive merits of striptease dancing; 249 fussy worry over
federalism concerns in burden-shifting rules applicable to
employment discrimination cases; 250 picayune posturing over
emerging jurisprudence in sexual stereotyping employment cases; 251
and irksome discussion of class-of-one equal protection litigation. 252
b. Posner is Not a Nitpicker
Nitpicking, as previously stated, involves petty (and, therefore,
trivial) fault-finding or hair-splitting. 253 Considered in another
way, however, most of the “nitpicking tendencies” alleged to exist in
Judge Posner’s concurring judicial opinions 254 are really examples of
his extraordinary diligence as a federal appellate judge. Indeed,
these cases, examined from a different angle, are examples of: his
rightful concern that litigants in federal litigation have proper
standing; 255 his well-founded interest in avoiding cheapening the
meaning of habeas corpus standards in state prisoner petitions; 256
his judicious regard for articulating and applying appellate
Id. at 1419.
Chi. Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chi., 819 F.2d 732, 744 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
248 Money Store, Inc. v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 885 F.2d 369, 374–77 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner,
J., concurring).
249 Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089–99 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring).
250 Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 473–77 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J., concurring).
251 Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066–68 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner,
J., concurring).
252 Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 709–13 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring).
253 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
254 See supra Part III.B.4.a.
255 See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text.
246
247
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standards of review; 257 his impressive responsibility in delving into
the rights of citizens to be treated with regard to their constitutional
privacy entitlements; 258 and his free and independent role as a
federal appellate judge to comment on matters of legal importance
and to offer his own take on flagging, criticizing, solving, and
reconciling legal problems. 259
Looking at some further instances of nitpicking-at-first-blush
Posnerian concurrences that, upon deeper reflection, are worthwhile
concurring opinions can help us realize that Judge Posner typically
has good reasons to add his penetrating insight when he chooses to
concur. Consider his concurrence in Greider v. Duckworth. 260 On a
surface level, perhaps, Posner seeks to split hairs in this habeas
corpus case by seeking to separate “proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt” from proof of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 261
But, on a deeper level of analysis, Posner is right to make this
distinction in this case (involving a state law where the first
standard was allocated to the state as part of the prosecutor’s prima
facie case and the second standard allocated to the defendant as a
potential affirmative defense). 262 Take Judge Posner’s concurring
opinion in Gotches v. Heckler. 263 Upon initial reading, one might be
tempted to view his harangue about the “unduly harsh tone of
criticism of the government” 264 in delaying resolution of a railroad
retiree’s widow’s claim for federal benefits as trifling; yet, when one
pauses to take in the full import of Posner’s critique, which boils
down to the pragmatic necessity of allowing federal governmental
officials to properly consider the consequences of signing a consent
decree with far-ranging programmatic effects, his opinion takes on
heft. And scrutinize Posner’s concurrence in United States v.
Hall. 265 Why is it necessary for the judge to wax on to further
expound upon a statement in the majority opinion that “may puzzle
some readers,” to wit, “[a]n attempt to define reasonable doubt
presents a risk without any real benefit?” 266 A preliminary reaction
See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 247–52 and accompanying text.
260 701 F.2d 1228, 1235 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring).
261 Id. at 1236.
262 Id. at 1235.
263 773 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring).
264 Id.
For a discussion of Posner’s concurrence in Gotches and as an example of
institutional concern, see supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text.
265 854 F.2d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring).
266 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
257
258
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to this concurrence might be to skip the surplus that you would
expect to follow. But that would be a mistake because Posner has
useful points to add to the majority opinion that held that it was not
reversible error for the trial judge to give the jury a reasonable
doubt instruction. 267 First, Posner nods to the “district judge” who
should be allowed, without reversal on appeal, to give a reasonable
doubt instruction when “on the basis of his experience with juries
and his observation of the particular jury thinks that such an
instruction would help the jurors” in deliberating on a criminal law
verdict. 268 Second, he explains that in spite of appellate deference
to the lower court on this matter, “ordinarily the district judge will
be well advised to attempt no definition of reasonable doubt”
because “[t]his advice reflects experience (almost uniformly
negative) with attempts to define the term.” 269 As Posner wisely
points out: “The verbal elaborations that have been tried appear to
add little if any substance to the meaning conveyed by the term
itself; deeply entrenched in the popular culture as it is, the term
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ may be the single legal term that jurors
understand best.” 270 Thus, “[d]efinitions that translate the term
into a probabilistic measure, while they may add content, are apt to
mislead the jurors.” 271 Third, Posner illustrates his analysis with
colorful contrasting illustrations.
He says, “proof beyond a
reasonable doubt requires . . . that the jury be certain of the
defendants’ guilt, with this proviso: complete certainty—the
certainty of such propositions as that cats do not grow on trees and
that I have never set foot on Mars—is never attainable” in a
criminal trial setting. 272 Finally, in concluding his Hall concurrence
Judge Posner offers valuable and practical insights which usefully
amplify the majority opinion:
Numerical estimates of probability are helpful in
investments, gambling, scientific research, and many other
activities but are not likely to be helpful in the setting of jury
deliberations. No objective probability of a defendant’s guilt
can be estimated other than in the rare case that turns
entirely on evidence whose accuracy can be rigorously
expressed in statistical terms (e.g., fingerprints and
267
268
269
270
271
272

Id. at 1037–38 (Kanne, J., majority).
Id. at 1044 (Posner, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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paternity tests). In other cases the jury’s subjective estimate
would float free of check and context. It is one thing to tell
jurors to set aside unreasonable doubts, another to tell them
to determine whether the probability that the defendant is
guilty is more than 75, or 95, or 99 percent.
If judges are not going to tell juries to attach a percentage
figure to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and if attempts at
verbal elaboration of reasonable doubt are likely to yield
barren tautologies, it makes practical sense not to instruct
the jury at all on the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. I therefore agree with [the majority’s] admonition to
the district judges. 273
5. Posner as Weaver of Hypotheticals and Wordplay: The Law
Professor as Judge
In the course of writing his concurring judicial opinions, Judge
Posner has manifested an appetite for hypothetical scenarios and
elegant wordplay—habits of thought that, perhaps, he carries over
from being a law professor. 274
In his concurrence in Greider v. Duckworth, Posner memorably
describes how madness impacts the criminal law:
You can be insane yet still be capable of entertaining the
subjective desire to kill a human being. But you cannot be
convicted of murder if you are so crazy that you kill without
knowing what you are doing. Thus, if Greider was under the
delusion that he was shooting two gerbils rather than two
human beings, he could not be guilty of murder, but if this
delusion took the form of thinking that he had a sacred duty
to reduce the human population by two, he could be guilty of
murder, at least guilty prima facie, though he might have a
defense of insanity. 275
In Bohen v. City of East Chicago, a female dispatcher for the city
fire department was fired, according to her allegations, because she
filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)

Id. at 1044–45 (citation omitted).
Judge Posner is a lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School and, prior to his
appointment as a federal appellate judge, was a full tenured professor at that school—
becoming in 1969 the youngest tenured professor in Chicago’s history. See Blomquist,
Playing on Words, supra note 1, at 684.
275 701 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
273
274
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complaint concerning sexual harassment. 276 Judge Posner filed a
concurring opinion in the case involving the equal protection claim,
noting that he “would characterize [the claim] differently from [the
majority opinion]: not as a claim of sexual harassment but as a
claim of failure to protect the plaintiff against such harassment.” 277
This difference in approach was “important,” as Posner put it,
“because the male employees who actually harassed her are not the
people she has sued.” 278
Later in his separate opinion, he
illustrated this distinction with a hypothetical:
All this is not to suggest that the equal protection clause
requires a state or municipality to devote disproportionate
resources to preventing (or, more realistically, limiting)
sexual harassment. Suppose the City of East Chicago had
for purely fiscal reasons decided that in its fire department
the law of the jungle would reign; the city would not
discipline any employee for any misconduct, sexual or
otherwise,
toward
another
employee—whether
the
misconduct was theft, or battery, or rape, or anything else.
Then women employees, even if they were hurt more by the
policy than the men, could not complain of a selective
withdrawal of protection, and hence of intentional
discrimination against them, any more than they could
complain if the city paid the market wage rate to all its
employees and the rate happened to be higher for men than
for women. But the record does not suggest that the city was
indifferent to employees’ misconduct toward each other; so
far as appears, the city disciplined employees for all
misconduct except sexual harassment, with the result of
giving its female employees systematically less protection
than its male employees. 279
Judge Posner’s concurrence in Bohen crystallizes the nub of the
dispute and offers a better way of conceptualizing the suit against
the municipality than the majority opinion because Bohen’s action
is against her governmental employer, not the individual male
employees who harassed her.
In a Title VII Civil Rights Act suit brought by a Jew, Jerold Pime,

799 F.2d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1189 (Posner, J., concurring).
278 Id.
279 Id. at 1191 (citation omitted).
For a Law and Economics discussion of Posner’s
concurrence, see supra note 154.
276
277
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Loyola University of Chicago’s policy of reserving three vacancies in
the Philosophy Department for Jesuit professors was challenged. 280
The majority opinion held that having a Jesuit presence in the
Philosophy Department was a bona fide occupational qualification
under the statute. 281 Judge Posner agreed with the majority “that
Pime must lose this Title VII case” but his “ground [was] different
from and narrower than [his] brethren’s ground”; Posner thought
that being denied a tenure-track position for not being a Jesuit was
not a deprivation of an employment opportunity because of
religion. 282 In a first set of hypotheticals in his Pime concurrence,
Posner explained the basis for his difference in rationale from the
majority’s rationale:
It is true that you cannot be a Jesuit if you are not a
Catholic; but only a tiny fraction of Catholics are Jesuits. If
Pime were a Catholic but not a Jesuit he would be just as
ineligible for the position as he is being a Jew, yet it would be
odd indeed to accuse Loyola of discriminating against
Catholics because it wanted to reserve some positions in its
philosophy department for Jesuits, thus excluding most
Catholics from consideration. Not only is Pime’s being
Jewish an adventitious circumstance in this case but so is
the fact that Loyola is a Catholic school. It is hard to believe
that the philosophy department of the University of
Chicago—or of Brandeis University—would be guilty of a
prima facie violation of Title VII if it reserved a few slots for
Jesuits, believing that the Jesuit point of view on philosophy
was one to which its students should be exposed; and Loyola
should have the same right. To take another example,
suppose Loyola reserved a slot for a rabbi, to teach Jewish
theology; would this be a prima facie violation of Title VII? I
cannot believe it would be; and if this conclusion is right it
casts doubt on my brethren’s assumption that the mere fact
of reserving one or more slots for members of a religious
order establishes a prima facie case. 283
Based on his reasoning that “Pime ha[d] not made out a prima
facie case of discrimination” on grounds of religion, Judge Posner
continued his concurring opinion by arguing that “we need not
280
281
282
283

Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 354.
Id. (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 354–55.
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decide whether Loyola could rebut such a case by proving either
that Loyola is a religious employer . . . or that being a Jesuit is a
bona fide occupational qualification” under Title VII. 284 Indeed, as
Posner explains in a second set of hypotheticals in his Pime
concurrence, the logic of such an occupational qualification is on
shaky ground:
Loyola wants to reserve seven of 31 tenure slots in the
philosophy department for Jesuits, without specifying any
subject-matter for the seven. There is no course that it
believes only a Jesuit qualified to teach; it wants Jesuits in
the department in order to maintain (as my brethren put it)
“the educational tradition and character of the institution.”
Although a worthy objective, this may not create the tight fit
that the statute appears to require by the words “reasonably
necessary.” No doubt it would be nice to have a minimum
number of Jesuits in a school with a strong Jesuit tradition
but by this type of reasoning the concept of bona fide
occupational qualification could expand almost without limit.
On the same type of showing made here, a men’s clothing
store could claim a right to hire only men as salesmen in
order to maintain the character of the store, or Ivy League
universities the right to maintain a ceiling on the number of
Jews in some departments in order to maintain the
traditional character of those departments and of the
university. 285
Posner effectively and powerfully deployed allusions to irrational
methods of divination in his concurring opinion in Marozsan v.
United States, 286 a case reargued en banc before the entire Seventh
Circuit. He agreed with the majority’s holding that a veterans’
benefit statute, which foreclosed judicial review of the Veterans’
Administration actions with respect to benefits, did not, however,
preclude judicial review of the constitutionality of procedures used
by the government agency in denying benefits. 287 Judge Posner
wrote separately, in part, to rail against what he characterized as “a
textbook illustration of the deficiencies of literalism as a style of
statutory interpretation.” 288 His divination allusion is packaged in

284
285
286
287
288

Id. at 356.
Id.
852 F.2d 1469, 1479–80 (7th Cir. 1988) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1482.
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the form of a hypothetical:
The government acknowledges that there is no purchase
in the language or history of the [veterans’ benefits] statute
for a distinction between procedural and substantive
constitutional claims. . . . The distinction lacks even
intuitive appeal unless one contrasts a strong substantive
claim with a weak procedural one . . . . Compare instead a
contention that a difference in the level of veterans’ benefits
based on whether the veteran participated in a declared war
rather than in an undeclared war is arbitrary, and hence a
denial of equal protection . . . with a contention that the
Veterans’ Administration denies a veteran due process of law
by submitting his claim to trial by Ouija board or Tarot pack.
It would be arbitrary to suggest that the first contention
could ground a federal suit but not the second. The only
principled ground for a decision in favor of the government in
this case would be that the judicial correction of
unconstitutional denials of veterans’ benefit claims is
forbidden no matter what the nature of the constitutional
infirmity. 289
Posner’s concurring opinions are chock-full of hypotheticals which
he utilizes to clarify his own approach to issues as well as to make
rhetorical points. Thus, in his concurring opinion in Money Store,
Inc. v. Harriscorp Finance, Inc., he warns against strict limits on
judicial modification of consent decrees in “litigation seeking to
reform private institutions”; 290 in his concurrence in Miller v. Civil
City of South Bend, he seems to think out loud by opining that “[i]t
is tempting to argue that a striptease just can’t be expressive
because if it is then everything is—including kicking one’s
wastebasket in anger and putting geraniums in a window box”; 291 in
his concurring opinion in Ragsdale v. Turnock, he notes, by way of a
hypothetical, to point out that “for many purposes the law does treat
[fetuses] as people” such that “[i]n Illinois, if you shoot a pregnant

Id. (emphasis added).
885 F.2d 369, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., concurring). His hypothetical states:
Suppose a group of white workers brought a “reverse discrimination” suit complaining
about the effect of their employer’s affirmative-action plan on the employment of whites.
The employer might be entirely willing to consent to the entry of a decree that would
make it more difficult to hire blacks. If the black workers persuaded the employer to
seek modification of the decree, the court ought not consider itself cabined . . . .
Id.
291 904 F.2d 1081, 1092 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring).
289
290
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woman in the abdomen and kill the fetus, you are guilty of the
crime of intentional homicide of an unborn child, and the penalty is
almost as severe as for first-degree murder”; 292 concurring in United
States v. Gage, he illustrates that “[i]ntention and desire are not
synonyms” in the law by the hypothetical: “If you plant a bomb in a
plane desiring only to kill the passenger whose heir you are, you are
guilty of first-degree murder (deliberate, premeditated) of the other
passengers who die in the crash as well, even though you didn’t
desire their death”; 293 in his concurrence in EEOC v. Indiana Bell
Telephone Co., he proposes a hypothetical case to show that it may
be relevant in a future case of workplace harassment for a collective
bargaining agreement to be considered as part of a potential
defense; 294 and his concurring opinion in Bell v. Duperrault
hypothesizes “irrational differences in treatment having nothing to
do with discrimination against a vulnerable class abound at the
bottom rung of law enforcement” such that “federal courts will be
swamped with ‘class of one’ cases remote from the purpose . . . of the
equal protection clause” 295 under the following illustration:
A police car is lurking on the shoulder of a highway in a 45
m.p.h. zone, a car streaks by at 65 m.p.h. and the police do
nothing. Two minutes later a car streaks by at 60 m.p.h. and
the police give that driver a ticket. Is it a denial of equal
protection if the police cannot come up with a rational

941 F.2d 501, 508 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J., concurring).
183 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., concurring).
294 256 F.3d 516, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner
wrote:
Let me propose a hypothetical case, not altogether remote from the present one though
readily distinguishable from it, to which the existence and terms of a collective
bargaining agreement would be relevant. A worker complains to a supervisor that
another worker is harassing her. The supervisor responds by immediately transferring
the alleged harasser to another part of the workplace. But because of the design of the
workplace the transfer does not keep the two workers apart all the time and the worker
who complained insists to the supervisor that the harasser be fired. The supervisor
replies that the company’s collective bargaining agreement protects workers from being
fired other than for cause and entitles any worker sought to be terminated for cause to
notice and a hearing before a joint labor-management committee with appeal to an
arbitrator, the entire procedure from complaint to final arbitration to be completed
within 21 days. The complaint is filed and the arbitrator rules that the accusation of
harassment is false and indeed malicious and therefore that there is no basis for
terminating the harasser or even for separating him from the complainant.
Suppose the complainant then brought suit against the company under Title VII,
charging that it had acted unreasonably in failing to fire her alleged harasser, as she had
urged.
Id.
295 367 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring).
292
293
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explanation for why they ticketed the slower speeder? 296
Judge Posner’s masterful use of hypotheticals and appropriate
allusions in his concurring judicial opinions are incisive and
instructive to the bench and bar alike. Moreover, this creative
wordplay helps him to grope his way through issues in many cases
that he judges on appeal, and to arrive at nuanced and measured
takes on these often complex doctrinal matters.
6. Posner the Great: Of Finding and Cutting Judicial Gordian
Knots
Legend has it that when Alexander the Great took up the ancient
challenge of untying the famous Gordian Knot, he “solved” the
puzzle by taking his sword and cutting the knot in two. 297 In the
same spirit, Judge Posner has frequently used concurring opinions
to cut a variety of legal knots that have hamstrung his fellow
judges.
In his concurrence in Gautreaux v. Pierce, for example, Posner
wrote that he was “not persuaded by the grounds on which the
district court [and his appellate colleagues] rejected the [plaintiffs’]
objections to” the density requirements of a public housing project in
Chicago. 298 Judge Posner “would affirm but on another ground.” 299
That bold alternative ground was based on a lack of standing: “these
appellants are neither parties to the [consent] decree nor thirdparty beneficiaries; therefore they have no standing to complain
that its terms are being violated.” 300
Posner’s concurring opinion in Pime v. Loyola University of
Chicago—an opinion that we have previously examined as an
example of Posnerian hypotheticals and wordplay 301 —can also be
viewed as an instance of Posner wanting to resolve an appeal on a
bold alternative ground which nonetheless agrees with the result of
the majority opinion on appeal in dismissing the claim. 302 In Pime,

Id.
In 333 B.C. “[a]t Gordium in Phrygia, tradition records his cutting of the Gordian knot,
which could only be loosed by the man who was to rule Asia; but this story may be apocryphal
or at least distorted.” Alexander III the Great, 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 468,
469 (15th ed. 1974).
298 707 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring).
299 Id.
300 Id. at 272.
For discussion of Posner’s Gautreaux concurrence as an institutional
critique, see supra notes 184–95 and accompanying text.
301 See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
302 803 F.2d 351, 354 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring).
296
297
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Posner characterized the employment discrimination suit by a
Jewish professor, who complained about the university’s reservation
of tenure track slots in the philosophy department for Jesuit
scholars as religious discrimination, as not really involving religious
discrimination at all. 303 Accordingly, he thought the majority’s
reliance on the bona fide occupational qualification defense of Title
VII was unwise and unnecessary. 304 As Posner opined:
If I am wrong in thinking that Loyola is not guilty of
prima facie discrimination, I would give serious
consideration to interpreting the defense of bona fide
occupational qualification broadly enough to reach what
Loyola has done, for it seems so remote from any concern
that Congress had when it passed Title VII. But it is not
necessary to decide whether Loyola has made out this
defense and I think it would be the better part of valor to
forgo reliance on it and place decision on the narrower
ground. For reasons having nothing to do with antipathy to
Jews or other non-Catholics, Loyola wants to have a certain
proportion of its philosophy professors drawn from a
particular religious order to which, as I have said, most
Catholics do not belong and could not belong, because they
would be either unable to satisfy the demanding entrance
requirements or unwilling to take the vows of poverty,
chastity, and obedience. In giving a modest and thoroughly
understandable preference to members of this order, in
circumstances that rebut any inference of invidious
discrimination, Loyola is not discriminating against
members of any religious faith within the meaning of Title
VII. 305
Judge Posner’s concurrence in United States v. Jackson is another
prominent example of his penchant for cutting to the essential heart
of the matter. 306 Instead of relying on the majority opinion’s
principal ground that the criminal defendant was improperly left in
the dark, and did not receive adequate notice, prior to his
sentencing for bank fraud concerning a more severe sentence
because of Jackson’s purported abuse of a position of trust, 307

303
304
305
306
307

Id.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
32 F.3d 1101, 1111 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 1110 (majority opinion).
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Posner thought it better to resolve the appeal on the less
controversial, alternative ground that the sentencing judge erred in
presuming that Jackson “had abused a position of trust.” 308
Referencing the criminal law doctrine of “plain error,” which allows
an appellate court to notice and correct palpable trial error, “even if
it is not argued” on appeal, 309 Posner unsheathed his sword and
verbally cut through the lack of notice verbiage in the majority
opinion as follows:
Although the point is not argued by Jackson’s lawyer, it is
virtually certain that the district judge erred in holding that
Jackson had abused a position of trust. He was a money
marketing clerk paid $15,000 a year. A job so denominated
and so meagerly remunerated is most unlikely to have been
more responsible than that of a teller, and the [advisory]
note to the relevant guideline says that embezzlement or
theft by an ordinary bank teller does not warrant an
adjustment for abuse of trust. 310
Yet, Judge Posner in his concurrences has also cut through legal
knots to forcefully make the case for a broader ground of decision
than the majority based its holding upon. His 1998 concurring
opinion in Rodriguez v. City of Chicago exemplifies this approach. 311
Rodriguez, a Chicago police officer, sued the city alleging that the
police department engaged in religious discrimination in violation of
Title VII in refusing to excuse him from guarding abortion clinics in
the police district to which he was assigned. 312 The majority held
that the officer had not been discriminated against in violation of
the statute because the police department had provided Rodriguez
with the opportunity, through the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, to transfer with no reduction in his level of
compensation to a district within the city that did not have an
abortion clinic. 313 Writing in his, then, capacity as Chief Judge of
the Circuit, Posner would have audaciously held—in addition to
that Rodriguez had been afforded appropriate accommodation—
“that police officers and firefighters have no right under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to recuse themselves from having to
protect persons of whose activities they disapprove for religious (or
308
309
310
311
312
313

Id. at 1112 (Posner, C.J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
156 F.3d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 773–74 (majority opinion).
Id. at 778.
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any other) reasons.” 314
As an initial matter, Judge Posner’s
concurring opinion confidently asserts a theory for sometimes
deciding cases on broad rather than narrow grounds:
It is a matter of judgment whether to base the decision of
an appeal on a broad ground, on a narrow ground, or on both,
when both types of ground are available. If the judges are
dubious about the broad ground, then they will do well to
decide only on the narrow ground; but if they are confident of
the broad ground, they should base decision on that ground
(as well as on the narrow ground, if equally confident of it) in
order to maximize the value of the decision in guiding the
behavior of persons seeking to comply with the law. One of
the most important things that appellate courts do is to
formulate rules of law. They would formulate very few rules,
and leave the law in a state of considerable and avoidable
uncertainty, if they always chose to decide a case on the
narrowest possible ground. It is true that the broader the
ground, the more likely it is to sweep in cases that the judges
cannot perfectly foresee, and this argues for caution in
deciding cases on broad grounds, because there is greater
risk of error, and for a willingness to carve exceptions as new
cases imperfectly foreseen arise. But I think that we could
prudently have gone further in this case than the majority
opinion does to clarify the law governing the duty of publicsafety agencies to accommodate the religious beliefs of their
employees, rather than leave the law in a state of uncertainty
which the majority opinion may actually increase. 315
As a second matter, Posner offered policy justifications for a
blanket rule of no cause of action under Title VII to claim exemption
from duties to protect the public. In this regard, he opined that
Rodriguez “is not entitled to demand that his police duties be
altered to conform to his [religious views] any more than a volunteer
member of the armed forces is entitled to demand that he be
excused from performing military duties that conflict with his
religious faith.” 316 Moreover, Posner would extend the analogy by
disclaiming that “a firefighter is entitled to demand that he be
entitled to refuse to fight fires in the places of worship of religious

314
315
316

Id. at 779 (Posner, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
Id. at 779.
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sects that he regards as Satanic.” 317 According to Judge Posner,
“[t]he objection to recusal in all of these cases” is not governmental
inconvenience but “the loss of public confidence in governmental
protective services if the public knows that its protectors are at
liberty to pick and choose whom to protect.” 318 He went on to
express this policy consideration in concrete and vivid prose:
The public knows that its protectors have a private
agenda; everyone does. But it would like to think that they
leave that agenda at home when they are on duty—that
Jewish policemen protect neo-Nazi demonstrators, that
Roman Catholic policemen protect abortion clinics, that
Black Muslim policemen protect Christians and Jews, that
fundamentalist Christian policemen protect noisy atheists
and white-hating Rastafarians, that Mormon policemen
protect Scientologists, and that Greek-Orthodox policemen of
Serbian ethnicity protect Roman Catholic Croats. We judges
certainly want to think that U.S. Marshals protect us from
assaults and threats without regard to whether, for example,
we vote for or against the pro-life position in abortion
cases. 319
To Posner, “[t]he importance of public confidence in the neutrality
of its protectors is so great that a police department or fire
department or equivalent public-safety agency that decides not to
allow recusal by its employees should be able to plead undue
hardship and thus escape any duty of accommodation.” 320
In another concurring opinion in Shields v. Local 705,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Pension Plan, 321 Judge
Posner, like in his broad and bold concurrence in Rodriguez, 322
wanted to cut the Gordian Knot involving the ERISA principle of
promissory estoppel; he would “hold that promissory estoppel can
never be used to alter the terms of a defined-benefit plan, especially
when it is a multiemployer plan.” 323 Policy considerations were
paramount in Posner’s broad analysis. He observed, in this regard,
that:
If terms are added by the operation of promissory estoppel
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
188 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., concurring).
See supra notes 311–20 and accompanying text.
Shields, 188 F.3d at 903.
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that appear nowhere in the plan documents upon which the
actuarial calculations are based, that the actuaries who
designed the funding mechanism in the plan did not know
about, and that . . . do not purport merely to summarize the
plan, the plan may turn out to be seriously underfunded.
These considerations are decisive against allowing the
invocation of promissory estoppel in any case involving a
defined-benefit plan. 324
7. Posner as Reader and Interpreter of Statutes: Searching for
Pragmatic Construction
As one who is fascinated by the theory and practice of statutory
construction, 325 it is not surprising that Judge Posner has taken up
this subject in the course of several of his concurring judicial
opinions. Posner’s concurrences which have focused on problems of
interpreting statutes are vivid, penetrating, and helpful. These
opinions are not some abstract exercise in language amusements or
diversions.
Rather, a Posnerian concurring opinion about
interpreting statutory commands typically pays attention to the
purpose of the provision under review and how that purpose can be
practically carried out by the judiciary. Take his concurring opinion
in St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States where he disagreed
with the majority that a provision of the Internal Revenue Code
governed a transfer of stock by a father to a trust for his children’s
education pursuant to a divorce settlement; 326 Posner opined that
“[t]here is grave doubt that the statute is intended to have any
application except in gift-tax cases but in any event it has no useful
application to this case.” 327 Rather than warping the language and
purpose of the statutory provision to fit the facts of the case, Posner
agreed that the distribution of stock was taxable to the father but
for the reasons of a binding Supreme Court precedent that he
claimed applied to the case at bar. 328
Take another concurring opinion by Judge Posner that turned on
issues of statutory interpretation: Michels v. United States Olympic
Committee. 329 Michels was a suit for injunction by an American
324
325
326
327
328
329

Id. at 905.
See Blomquist, Aesthetics of Canonicity, supra note 5, at 171.
716 F.2d 1180, 1186 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 1187.
Id.
741 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring).
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weightlifter who was successful in obtaining a preliminary
injunction from the district court, pursuant to the Amateur Sports
Act of 1978; 330 the preliminary injunction ordered the United States
Olympic Committee (USOC) “to name . . . Michels as a conditional
alternate to the 1984 United States Olympic Weightlifting Team
and to address the merits of Michels’ claims under International
Olympic Committee (IOC) procedures.” 331 Posner agreed with the
majority that the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 did not permit private
enforcement of the statute because of a compromise between
legislative sponsors backed up by the common sense “reflection that
there can be few less suitable bodies than the federal courts for
determining the eligibility, or the procedures for determining the
eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic Games.” 332
Judge Posner wrote separately, however, to argue that even if the
statute “could be enforced by a private suit, this suit would have to
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.” 333 On this separate
ground for vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction,
Judge Posner looked to both the text and purpose of the legislation
under scrutiny. As to the text, Posner pointed out that “[t]he only
relevant duty imposed by the Act is the duty of the United States
Olympic Committee to establish procedures for resolving disputes
involving any of its members and relating to the opportunity of an
amateur athlete . . . to participate in the Olympic Games.” 334
Michels’ dispute was “with the International Weightlifting
Federation, an international organization that is not a member of
the USOC” and, as Posner explained, “[h]is dispute was with the
nonmember, the international federation, and it was outside the
scope” of the statute. 335 As to the purpose of the statute, it makes
sense, according to Posner, that “the statute does not require the
U.S. Olympic Committee to establish machinery for resolving
disputes between athletes and nonmembers” since “[t]he USOC has
no control over nonmembers,” and, thus, “[t]he International
Weightlifting Federation can thumb its collective nose at the U.S.
Olympic Committee” and “if the USOC tried to put Michels on the
U.S. Olympic Weightlifting team in defiance of the IWF’s expulsion,
330 Id. at 156 (majority opinion); 36 U.S.C. §§ 371–396 (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C.
§§ 220501–220529 (1998)).
331 Michels, 741 F.2d at 156.
332 Id. at 158–59 (Posner, J., concurring).
333 Id. at 159.
334 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
335 Id.
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the IWF could ask the International Olympic Committee to
disqualify the team.” 336
Consider Judge Posner’s statutory analysis in his concurrence in
United States v. OCCI Co. where he expressed doubts concerning
existing precedent “that a mortgagor can set up, as an affirmative
defense to foreclosure by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the Department’s failure to comply with the
statement of national housing objectives in 42 U.S.C. § 1441.” 337
Seeking to sensibly consider whether Congress had a purpose in
passing the national housing legislation to allow delinquent
borrowers from the federal government to delay and complicate
government foreclosures, Posner wrote:
In this protracted [statutory] recital of hopes and homilies,
one finds few specifics . . . and none that bear on foreclosure
or could provide any guidance for a court called on to review
a decision to foreclose. I think Congress would be surprised
and dismayed to discover that by trying to give guidance of
the most general sort—inspiration would be a better word—
to HUD, it had made it harder for HUD to foreclose on
delinquent mortgages, by giving mortgagors an argument
with which to delay and very occasionally defeat foreclosure
or at least make the process of foreclosure more costly. 338
Note Posner’s purposeful statutory assessment of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in his concurring opinion in Pime v. Loyola
University of Chicago; 339 his careful review of the legislative history
of the religious-employer exemption led him to conclude that it was
inappropriate to apply the exception in the case at bar. 340 Look at
Judge Posner’s insistence on “the deficiencies of literalism as a style
of statutory interpretation” and his claim that “[t]he idea that
semantically unambiguous sentences—sentences clear ‘on their
face’—sentences whose meaning is ‘plain’—can be interpreted
without reference to purpose inferred from context is fallacious,” in
his concurrence in Marozsan v. United States. 341 In his concurring
opinion in Marozsan he rejected a literal interpretation of a
veterans’ benefits statute that would have precluded judicial

336
337
338
339
340
341

Id. at 159 (citations omitted).
758 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 1167.
803 F.2d 351, 354–58 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 357–58.
852 F.2d 1469, 1482 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring).
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review. 342 And, observe Posner’s measured interpretation of the
federal pension benefit statute, ERISA, in his Shields v. Local 705,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Pension Plan concurrence
when he wrote that “courts in ERISA cases retain their normal
common law powers to fill gaps in the statute. For statutes are
rarely comprehensive; they are enacted against a rich background of
common law principles that can be drawn on, as necessary, to put
flesh on the legislative skeleton” subject to the following important
interpretational qualification: “[A]ny common law elaborations of an
incomplete statute [addressing such issues as equitable or
promissory estoppel] must be consistent with the statute’s language
and animating policies.” 343
8. Posner’s Concerns About Standards of Appellate Review:
Judging Lower-Level Decision-Makers
Judge Posner is well-aware of the critical importance of the
standard of appellate review; 344 he has elaborated on this concern in
assorted concurring opinions. For example, in his concurrence in
Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., he devotes his entire opinion
to considering which of two standards of review (“clear abuse of
discretion” or “clearly erroneous”) should govern appellate review of
“a district judge’s finding in a trademark or other intellectualproperty case that the plaintiff was or was not guilty of laches.” 345
In clear and concise prose he probes analogous standards of review
for what he refers to as “pure factfindings” and “application of
substantive rules to facts of the who-did-what-to-whom variety.” 346
He affords a clarifying example to help understanding: “[I]f a
district judge found that the defendant in a personal-injury case had
been negligent, this finding, like a finding that the defendant had
been going 50 miles per hour, could be overturned on appeal only if
clearly erroneous.” 347 Moreover, in a tour-de-force of analysis,
Posner delineates that the review standard of “clear error has been
held to be the proper standard for reviewing determinations of most
Id. (discussing 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (repealed 1991)).
188 F.3d 895, 904 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
344 Cf. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF 372 (1999) (quoting FRANK M. COFFIN, ON
APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 114 (1994) (“[As an appellate judge, a] clear,
succinct, and authority-supported statement of standard of review gets me off to a good start
[in reading the briefs in a case.]”)).
345 741 F.2d 925, 935 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring).
346 Id. at 936.
347 Id. (citations omitted).
342
343
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mixed questions of law and fact in intellectual-property cases,” and
“[a]lthough some such questions, particularly in patent cases, are
treated as questions of law rather than questions of fact, none are
treated as discretionary determinations.” 348
Another prominent example of Judge Posner’s use of concurring
opinions to examine and re-examine precedents concerning
standards of review is his concurrence in United States v. OCCI
Co. 349 In that concurrence Posner took the unusual step for an
appellate judge to urge that review of decisions by HUD on whether
or not to foreclose on a government mortgage should be
“unreviewable.” 350 His reasons for this view are practical: “I do not
know what constructive contribution this or any other court can
make to the achievement of the nation’s housing goals by reviewing
HUD’s decision to foreclose” a government mortgage. 351 In addition,
according to his concurrence, “[t]here is no definite standard for a
reviewing court to apply, and, given the lack of such a standard,
little likelihood that a responsible reviewing court will ever
invalidate, under [the statute], a decision to foreclose.” 352
Furthermore, he added in this regard: “All that judicial review can
do in this setting is delay foreclosure and thereby complicate HUD’s
already daunting mission. If ever there was a case where judicial
review was unavailable because [as provided for under the
Administrative Procedure Act,] ‘agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law’ . . . this is the case.” 353
Judge Posner’s concurrence in Short v. Belleville Shoe
Manufacturing Co. provides another good illustration of his
penchant for unflinching consideration for the dimensions of
appropriate appellate standards of review. 354 The heart of Posner’s
point in his concurrence was the “standardless, discretionary
judgment” on appeal that is created when federal appellate courts
“[b]orrow[] a period of limitations from one statute to use with
another that doesn’t have its own limitations provision” in a
dispute. 355 His concern focused on the multifactored considerations
that bore on borrowing a statute of limitations “with no weights on

348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355

Id. at 936–37 (citations omitted).
758 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 1167.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000)) (other citations omitted).
908 F.2d 1385, 1393 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 1393–94.
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the factors.” 356 Thus:
Since courts cannot be expected to converge on a uniform
outcome when they are operating under such a standard,
predicting what statute of limitations will be borrowed is
impossible and as a result extensive litigation often is
necessary before a definitive conclusion on the limitations
period emerges. It may not come until a Supreme Court
decision is rendered resolving an intercircuit conflict that
was years in the brewing. 357
Writing in United States v. McKinney, Judge Posner’s concurring
opinion spent considerable ink over “a disagreement within the
[Seventh Circuit] over the standard for reviewing determinations of
probable cause.” 358 He voiced his opinion that in reviewing probable
cause determinations by lower-level decision makers “the proper
standard is the clearly-erroneous rule used in other areas of law to
review the application of a legal standard to a particular set of
facts.” 359 Drawing together, by way of an example, “a finding of
negligence in an ordinary tort suit,” with the finding of probable
cause in a criminal matter, Posner opined that the former
determination “is not a finding of fact in the sense that it could be
made by someone uninstructed in the legal standard of negligence.
Rather it is the application of the legal standard to the facts of the
particular case.” 360 Reviews of negligence findings, Posner points
out, are not de novo, but, rather, are “reviewed for clear error.” 361
So too, should appellate review of criminal law probable cause
findings be “deferential.” 362
Judge Posner’s concurring opinions that have discussed appellate
standards of review skillfully penetrate to the nub of matters on
appeal in federal courts: Which decision maker is in the best
position to grapple with the issue in question? What values should
apply in making and second-guessing various matters? And what
benefits and costs attend the use of one appellate standard of review
rather than another?

356
357
358
359
360
361
362

Id. at 1394.
Id.
919 F.2d 405, 418 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 418–19.
Id. at 419.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
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9. Posner Speaking Frankly: Bracing Directness as a Stylistic
Technique
Ah, what power and panache can come about from frank,
unadorned communication instead of prolix exercises in beating
around legal bushes! Judge Posner’s concurring opinions are
replete with powerfully direct language. One of his best no-holdsbarred concurrences was in United States v. Kaminski, at the start
of his career as a federal appellate judge, when he decided to “write
separately . . . to float a suggestion for giving practical content to
the elusive concept, which is fundamental to the entrapment
doctrine, of predisposition to commit a crime.” 363 In a passage,
worthy of full quotation, he wrote:
If the police entice someone to commit a crime who would
not have done so without their blandishments, and then
arrest him and he is prosecuted, convicted, and punished,
law enforcement resources are squandered in the following
sense: resources that could and should have been used in an
effort to reduce the nation’s unacceptably high crime rate are
used instead in the entirely sterile activity of first inciting
and then punishing a crime. However, if the police are just
inducing someone to commit sooner a crime he would have
committed eventually, but to do so in controlled
circumstances where the costs to the criminal justice system
of apprehension and conviction are minimized, the police are
economizing on resources. It is particularly difficult to catch
arsonists, so if all the police were doing here was making it
easier to catch an arsonist . . . they were using law
enforcement resources properly and there is no occasion for
judicial intervention. And I am persuaded that that is the
situation in this case.
Thus in my view “entrapment” is merely the name we give
to a particularly unproductive use of law enforcement
resources, which our system properly condemns. If this is
right, the implementing concept of “predisposition to crime”
calls less for psychological conjecture than for a commonsense assessment of whether it is likely that the defendant
would have committed the crime anyway—without the
blandishments the police used on him—but at a time and

363

703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring).
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place where it would have been more difficult for them to
apprehend him and the state to convict him, or whether the
police used threats or promises so powerful that a lawabiding individual was induced to commit a crime. If the
latter is the case, the police tactics do not merely affect the
timing and location of a crime; they cause crime. 364
On more frequent occasions, Judge Posner deploys phrases that
cut to the bone or sweep away niceties to uncover what is most
germane, what is essential, and where wisdom can be found. His
concurrences are loaded with this type of language, to wit:
“[T]his protracted recital of hopes and homilies.” 365
“We stray . . . when we say that the failure to promote a person
is . . . evidence that he was a victim of discrimination, when in fact
there is no reason to think he was even qualified for the promotion,
let alone that he was the best qualified for it.” 366
“I hesitate to add to the pile of opinions in this case; separate
opinions are the bane of the modern American judiciary.” 367
“[T]he reservation of a few tenure slots for Jesuits in a private
university founded by and to some extent still controlled by
Jesuits . . . is less offensive than a racial quota in a steel mill or a
fire department.” 368
“Karl Marx said that every great event or personality appears
twice in history: first as tragedy and then as farce. This case, a
prisoner’s civil rights case, illustrates his adage, provided we do not
insist on the greatness of the event.” 369
“Persons who would . . . rob a bank in the face of [a] 20-year
sentence are unlikely to be deterred by tightening the punishments
screws still further. A civilized society locks up such people until
age makes them harmless but it does not keep them in prison until
they die.” 370
“[I]f attempts at verbal elaboration of reasonable doubt are likely
to yield barren tautologies, it makes practical sense not to instruct
the jury at all on the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable

Id.
United States v. OCCI Co., 758 F.2d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring).
366 Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 137 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
367 Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir. 1985) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
368 Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring).
369 Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring).
370 United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1200 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring).
364
365
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doubt.” 371
“Inadequate punishment can work a miscarriage of justice, just as
excessive punishment can.” 372
Thirty years ago a striptease that ended in complete
nudity would have been thought obscene. No more. It is
worth pausing a moment to ask why. Nudity as titillation or
outrage is relative rather than absolute. In a society in
which women customarily go about in public bare-breasted,
there is no shock value in a bare breast, while in Victorian
England . . . a bare ankle was a sensation. 373
And, let us not overlook the following instances of Posnerian
plainspoken, upfront candor in his concurrences:
The Supreme Court’s unwavering attachment to the
principle leaves us no choice but to apply it, but that
attachment is beginning to be questioned, and I would like to
add my small voice to the chorus.
Borrowing a period of limitations from one statute to use
with another that doesn’t have its own limitations provision
is a matter of which round peg to stuff in a square hole. 374
“By such ostrich methods an incoherent approach to the review of
probable-cause determinations is perpetuated.” 375
“[O]nly in law is ‘innovative’ a pejorative.” 376
“Now all can see that the circuit’s position is a Rube Goldberg
invention: a needlessly complex machine, which incidentally does
not work.” 377
“I am not trying to defy the Supreme Court.” 378
“My brethren in defending the intermediate standard may in any
event be spitting into the wind.” 379
“In plumping for an intermediate standard my brethren are
bailing water from a ship that the captain has decided to scuttle.” 380
United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1044–45 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring).
United States v. D’Antoni, 874 F.2d 1214, 1222 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., concurring).
373 Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) (reh’g en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring).
374 Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1393 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
375 United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 420–21 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
376 Id. at 421 (parentheses omitted).
377 Id.
378 Id. at 422.
379 Id.
380 Id.
371
372
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“My brethren have become hopelessly entangled in words—they
have forgotten Justice Holmes’s admonition to think things not
words—but even at the level of semantics they strike out.” 381
“What is needed . . . is not a multiplicity of rigid rules stated in
empty jargon, or even three rigid rules that hack crudely at a
complex reality, but the sensitive application of the clear-error
standard.” 382
American law is too vague, too complicated, too expensive;
and it is these things in part because judges are too fond of
sterile verbalisms and outmoded distinctions. A tripartite
standard of appellate review of determinations of probable
cause is confusing, unworkable, and unnecessary. We should
not fear to reject it for fear of being called innovative. 383
“To object to a settlement on the ground that you shouldn’t have
done as well in the settlement as you did identifies you as an
ideological litigant; and an affront to one’s ideology is not an
interest that will support standing to sue.” 384
“[A] government official has decided to allow . . . human beings to
die because the official lacks the stomach, political or otherwise, to
litigate the case in the Supreme Court.” 385
“The acts of concealment were the acts by which the parties to the
kickbacks sought through the use of dummy corporations and the
like to make it difficult for anyone to discover that kickbacks were
being paid.” 386
“This is a harsh law, and one would expect the government in
enforcing it to make at least modest efforts to guard against
mistakes.” 387
“The INS was playing cat and mouse.” 388 “The procedural
sloppiness demonstrated by the INS . . . , although extraordinary, is
not grounds for reversal.” 389
“Should a 90–year–old commit arson, it might unduly depreciate
the gravity of his act to sentence him to a term of years equal to his
Id. at 423.
Id.
383 Id.
384 Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
385 Id. at 509.
386 Martin v. Consultants & Adm’rs, Inc., 966 F.2d 1078, 1103 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
387 Ghaly v. INS, 48 F.3d 1426, 1436 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring).
388 Id. at 1437.
389 Id. at 1438.
381
382
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life expectancy.” 390
“If the producer of Antony and Cleopatra refuses to cast an
effeminate man as Antony or a mannish woman as Cleopatra, he is
not discriminating against men in the first case and women in the
second, although he is catering to the audience’s sex stereotypes.” 391
10. En Banc Posner: Adding His Two-Cents
A final way to look at the concurring opinions of Judge Richard A.
Posner in his first twenty-five years on the federal appellate bench
is to observe his infrequent, though forceful, penchant for providing
his particular take, his emphases, his vision of a particular area of
federal jurisprudence that results in an en banc opinion by the full
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
By way of illustration, Posner has written separate concurrences
in en banc proceedings in a 1983 case involving a habeas corpus
proceeding by a state prisoner; 392 a suit by a former FBI agent
seeking damages against his former superior; 393 a 1985 case
involving a habeas corpus proceeding by a state prisoner; 394 a 1986
case involving a suit by a disgruntled federal job seeker denied
employment; 395 a 1988 Section 1983 civil rights case against a fire
dispatcher based on a failure to provide emergency rescue
services; 396 a 1988 appeal by a veteran seeking to challenge the
constitutionality of procedures employed by the Veteran’s
Administration in denying him benefits; 397 a 1990 case brought by
nude dancers and establishments offering nude dancing challenging
the constitutionality of Indiana’s public indecency statute; 398 and a

390 United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840, 849 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring)
(parentheses omitted).
391 Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
392 Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 892–93 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc denial of
reconsideration) (Posner, J., concurring).
393 Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
394 Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir. 1985) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
395 Perry v. FBI, 781 F.2d 1294, 1304 (7th Cir. 1986) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
396 Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1224 (7th Cir. 1988) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
397 Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1479–80 (7th Cir. 1988) (reh’g en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring).
398 Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089–90 (7th Cir. 1990) (reh’g en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring).
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2001 appeal involving the EEOC’s interpretation of federal
employment law against sexual harassment, and a collective
bargaining agreement between the employer and a labor union. 399
In the course of his concurring opinions to en banc circuit opinions,
Judge Posner has done more than to rehash legal analysis found in
the other opinions in the cases. Rather, his analysis has been
typically penetrating and perspicacious.
IV. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS
A. Judge Posner’s Evolving Style: The Strategic Inspiration of
Consubstantiality
In a quarter-century of judicial concurring opinions, Judge
Richard A. Posner has filed a number of true concurring opinions—
“announc[ing] and defend[ing] the author’s unwillingness to
subscribe to the majority’s rationale for an outcome that the author
supports.” 400
Prominent Posnerian true concurrences were in
Gautreaux v. Pierce (where he forcefully argued that a consent
decree that authorized a federal housing official to approve various
percentage of public housing to a “best interest of the community”
standard was nonjusticiable); 401 in EEOC v. Indiana Bell Telephone
Co. (where he vigorously questioned the institutional wisdom of full
court review of panel appellate opinions when the full appellate
court lacked experience in making generalizations about the
relevance of collective bargaining agreements in employment
discrimination suits); 402 and in Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago
(where he emphatically disputed the very existence of religious
discrimination and argued that it was unwise to decide the case by
application of the bona fide occupational qualification affirmative
Posner’s true concurrences are characterized by
defense). 403
concerns about avoiding hasty judicial decision making without
concrete facts and legal doctrine, about having courts steer clear of
reviewing essentially political questions which are better left to
other institutions, and about proper understanding and application

399 EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516, 529 (7th Cir. 2001) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
400 See supra text accompanying note 73.
401 See supra notes 184–195 and accompanying text.
402 See supra notes 226–31 and accompanying text.
403 See supra notes 280–85 and accompanying text.
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of legal doctrine by courts. From the standpoint of law and
aesthetics, Posner’s true concurrences are best understood as
articulations of “grid aesthetic” (visions of what the specific rules,
doctrines, standards and principles should properly be in a case)
with occasional explorations of “energy aesthetic” (issues of tension
or synergy between competing legal conceptions). 404
Yet, Judge Posner tends to file more two-cents concurrences—
announcing that “the author is willing to join in both the outcome
and rationale sponsored by the majority, but wishes to add [his]
own, presumably consistent, thoughts on the matter.” 405 Indeed,
because of the quantity and variety of Posner’s concurring opinions,
which ostensibly agree with the majority opinion in the case, we
might be tempted to argue that he finds it appealing to offer his
fifty-cents worth.
Thus, we find Posnerian enhancements,
embellishments, and upgrades to the majority opinions of his
Seventh Circuit colleagues in the category of concurrences which I
have called “Posner as Congressional Adviser” cases. 406 Judge
Posner relishes policy analysis and loves to consider the multiple
facets of public problems. Take his exhaustive essay on federal
habeas corpus rights of state prisoners in his concurring opinion in
United States v. Franzen: In the course of this separate opinion he
considered principles of federalism, the morale of state court judges,
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, the efficiency of
judges’ work products, the psychological well-being of habeas
petitioners, the accuracy of constitutional determinations, and the
historical background which gave rise to Congress’ enactment of the
most recent statute on habeas corpus. 407 Take his thorough review
of the wisdom of federal courts getting involved in intra-state, local
securities fraud cases in the course of his concurring opinion in
Trecker v. Scag. 408 Consider Posner’s concurrence in United States
v. D’Antoni where he looks at the purported logic of the federal
maximum sentence statute for conspiracy to kill a federal witness,
and ends up canvassing the federal criminal code with a
404 See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1051
(2002). Schlag’s grid aesthetic pictures law as follows: The grid is “a two-dimensional area
divided into contiguous, well-bounded legal spaces. These spaces are divided into doctrines,
rules, and the like. Those doctrines, rules, and the like are further divided into elements, and
so on and so forth.” Id. The energy aesthetic involves “[c]onflicting forces of principle, policy,
values, and politics [which] collide and combine in sundry ways.” Id.
405 See supra text accompanying note 73.
406 See supra Part III.B.1.
407 See supra notes 96–107 and accompanying text.
408 See supra notes 108–17 and accompanying text.
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comparative eye, and offering straightforward advice for a
legislative reworking of key sentencing provisions. 409 Posner’s Law
and Economics category of concurrences sometimes embody his
over-interpreting or overdoing the costs and benefits of various legal
issues with too much analysis. His Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc.
v. City of Chicago concurring opinion is a prime example of this
tendency. In that opinion, Judge Posner got carried away with his
economic reasoning to a degree that some of his analysis on the
likely impacts of Chicago’s rent control ordinance took on the
Still, Posner’s two-cents
coloration of rank speculation. 410
concurrences often add a vital perspective to a controversy. Go back
to his Archie v. City of Racine concurring opinion and see how he
does a better job than the majority opinion of explaining the failure
of survivors to make out a Section 1983 claim against a municipal
ambulance dispatcher. Posner combines a weighing of textual,
precedential, and policy considerations which tilt in favor of denying
the claim while acknowledging the human pathos (and possible
second class treatment) received by the black decedent from the
white dispatcher. 411
What strikes me as the most interesting general observation
about the quarter century of Posnerian concurring judicial opinions,
though, is Judge Posner’s virtuosity in strategically inspiring
consubstantiality with other judges on the Seventh Circuit. In this
regard, Posner uses concurrences as rhetorical tropes to unite
subscribing judges of the majority with his own spin on the law by
delicately exploiting ambiguity to unite divergent tendencies on the
appellate court and by persuasively condensing competing values in
a case at a sufficiently abstract level. 412 While Posner sometimes is
ham-handed in a quest for consubstantiality by overplaying his
hand with too much detail which can not be reasonably merged with
the reasoning of the majority opinion, 413 think about those
concurring performances where he pulls off fundamental agreement
with his views of the law and the outcome of the case by subtly
orchestrating abstract agreement with the majority. Think about

See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
411 See supra notes 215–23 and accompanying text.
By bringing to bear his unique
perspective on the law (combining economics, deft interpretation, and sympathy for the
underdog), Judge Posner’s two-cents concurrences are characterized by what Schlag has
called a perspectivist aesthetic. See Schlag, supra note 404, at 1052.
412 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
413 See, e.g., supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
409
410
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his uses of ambiguity in the statutory interpretation case of Michels
v. United States Olympic Committee.
In that case Posner
rhetorically persuaded the majority to disallow an athlete’s attempt
to use the federal courts to second-guess amateur athletic
organizational decision making; his ostensible agreement that the
disgruntled weightlifter could not use a federal statute to privately
enforce his own claim was backed up by the rhetorically persuasive
observation that even if the statute could be privately enforced, the
weightlifter’s lawsuit would have to be dismissed for failure to state
a claim. 414 Or contemplate Posner’s strategic concurrence with the
dismissal of the mortgagor’s appeal in United States v. OCCI Co.,
where he expressed ambiguous doubt about the continued validity
of precedent that allowed a mortgagor to assert an affirmative
defense of noncompliance by HUD with the broad national housing
objectives set forth in the federal statute, and cleverly
characterizing the substance of those national housing objectives as
nothing more than “hopes and homilies” with “few specifics.” 415 Or
meditate on the ingenious way that Judge Posner advances the
overarching attractiveness of a purposeful method of statutory
construction by his strategic concurrence in Marozsan v. United
States. He agreed with the majority opinion which construed a
federal veterans benefit statute as allowing judicial review of an
administrative agency determination; he supported his concurrence
with ambiguous general comments that would be hard for his
colleagues to disagree with, to wit, “the deficiencies of literalism as
a style of statutory interpretation” coupled with his denigration of
“[t]he idea that semantically unambiguous sentences—sentences
clear ‘on their face’—sentences whose meaning is ‘plain’—can be
interpreted without reference to purpose inferred from context” in a
statutory scheme. 416
B. The Aesthetics of Judicial Concurring Style
What thoughts does our detailed examination of the concurring
opinion oeuvre of Judge Richard A. Posner inspire regarding the
uses and attractiveness (or lack of attractiveness) of judicial
appellate concurrences? What follows are some tentative and halfbaked notes and unanswered questions.

414
415
416

See supra notes 329–36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 337–38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 341–42 and accompanying text.
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1. While law makes moral claims by its very nature, law can
also be, as John Gardner of Oxford’s University College has written,
“regarded and evaluated as . . . an object of aesthetic appreciation:
as a literary genre, an intellectual architecture, a social spectacle,
and so on.” 417 Thus, just as “[l]awyers not infrequently come to
think of their work as one might think of a work of art, prizing
elegance, coherence, balance, and other aesthetic virtues, over
moral virtues such as honesty, generosity, and humanity,” 418
appellate judges and the readers of appellate judicial opinions may
come to value aesthetics over morality. Is such valuation legitimate
and proper?
Are concurring appellate judicial opinions
“mainly . . . object[s] of aesthetic criticism, mainly suited to being
deconstructed and transfigured and problematized?” 419 On a higher
plane: “Is there any authentic moral insight lurking within an
aesthetics of law [and concurring judicial opinions]?
Does
approaching the law [and concurring judicial opinions]
as . . . object[s] of aesthetic appreciation count as any more than a
vain distraction from the real job of revealing [their] moral
strengths and weaknesses?” 420 According to one take on these
questions, based on “the web of Nietzsche’s revisionist aesthetics
morality,” indeed, “the highest admiration is reserved for the testing
of one’s creative limits, and . . . true virtue lies in overcoming all
that constrains and dampens the human spirit.” 421 Seen in such a
light, appellate concurring opinions might be used more creatively
by judges to add to, improve, and enrich the law. But are there
examples of “good” creativity and “bad” creativity in the production
of judicial concurrences?
2. Can creative judicial concurring opinions be more
imaginatively conceived and fashioned by appellate judges to assist
in the greater production of good legal ideas? 422 Is it wrong for
appellate judges to use their concurrences to float ideas to the
legislature, the executive, or the administrative agencies? If so,
why is it wrong? If it is not wrong, how can concurrences be
417 John Gardner, General Editor’s Preface to ADAM GEAREY, LAW AND AESTHETICS, at vii
(John Gardner ed., 2001).
418 Id.
419 Id.
420 Id. at viii.
421 Id.
422 Cf. PETER WATSON, IDEAS: A HISTORY OF THOUGHT AND INVENTION FROM FIRE TO
FREUD 10 (2005) (discussing as one of the main failures in the field of intellectual history: the
“failure among both historians and scientists to get to grips with ‘imagination’ as a dimension
in life generally and in particular so far as the production of ideas is concerned”).
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improved to better help these non-judicial legal institutions?
Moreover, how can concurring judicial opinions be improved to
better help an appellate court refine and evolve its legal doctrine in
discrete substantive and procedural areas? How can concurring
judicial opinions be improved to assist higher appellate courts (i.e.,
a supreme court in a jurisdiction) refine and evolve legal doctrine?
3. How does the view that judicial concurring opinions are
strategically used by appellate judges to advance consubstantiality
through artful use of ambiguous language 423 fit with the notion that
concurring opinions can help improve the law over time? 424
4. Among the four major types of legal aesthetics—the grid
aesthetic, the energy aesthetic, the perspectivist aesthetic, and the
dissociative aesthetic 425 —what aesthetics do appellate judges favor
when they craft concurring opinions? Remember, we have seen that
when Judge Posner writes a true concurring opinion his style tends
to reflect the grid aesthetic and the energy aesthetic. 426 Posner’s
two-cents concurrences, however, are characterized by a
perspectivist aesthetic. 427 Posner’s use of the dissociative aesthetic
is rare (in his concurrences); but his concurring opinion in United
States v. McKinney fits the bill of lawyers or judges talking past one
another, with Judge Posner willing to judicially innovate to arrive
at a more workable and coherent standard of review in criminal
probable cause cases, and the majority opinion finding such judicial
innovation totally inappropriate in light of purported Supreme
Court precedent which already established the standard of
review. 428 Do appellate judges learn from one another when a
dissociative aesthetic appears in a colleague’s concurring opinion?
Or, do ideological positions harden in such cases? Are these types of
See supra notes 413–14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 421–22 and accompanying text.
425 See supra notes 404, 411 and accompanying text.
Schlag defines the dissociative
aesthetic of law as follows:
Nothing is what it is, but is always already something else. Any attempt to refer to X is
frustrated, as even the most minimal inquiry reveals that X is an unstable glomming-on
of many other things that cannot be subsumed or stabilized within any one thing. The
crucial contributions of the prior aesthetics . . . have all collapsed. No determinable
identities, relations, or perspectives survive.
Schlag, supra note 404, at 1052.
426 See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
427 See supra note 411 and accompanying text.
428 See supra notes 375–83 and accompanying text. Compare United States v. McKinney,
919 F.2d 405, 421 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (“[O]nly in law is ‘innovative’ a
pejorative.”), with id. at 409 (majority opinion) (disparaging Posner’s proposed approach as
inappropriate and involving “bold initiatives” which flew in the face of Supreme Court
precedent).
423
424
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raw concurrences helpful to the Supreme Court Justices reviewing
an issue where there are conflicting views on the Court of
Appeals? 429
5. As recent critical scholarship has argued, lawyers and judges
should return to the classical view of law as a creative enterprise
that is deeply dependent on persuasive narration and literary
prowess. As explained in the introduction of a 1999 book entitled
Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics of Law:
Law’s art has been recently explored from a literary
perspective. The school of jurisprudence variously described
as “law and literature” or “literary jurisprudence” has
revived the classical tradition for which successful law was
perceived as a felicitous language and instruction into the
legal arcana involved an introduction to the power of
beautiful speech. The earliest customs and laws of Greece
took the form of legends, myths, and tales, the earliest judge
was a histor. The first legal form was the narrative, and the
great lawgivers—Solon, Lycurgus, Plato himself—were
successful narrators. . . . Demosthenes and Cicero were
instructed in forensic rhetoric and the felicitous uses of
speech and oratorical skill as well as in legal technique and
procedure.
In a more general sense, throughout history law has been
the performative language par excellence, a language whose
success is measured by its consequences, its ability to act on
the world. 430
Persuasive narration of law—and its impact on human beings and
social institutions in the real world—is a role to be played not only
by paid advocates in a case but by appellate judges who are troubled
by some dimension of a case on appeal. A potentially useful way of

429 Adam Gearey discusses a law and aesthetics concept stemming from the work of
Roberto Unger which to my mind is similar to Schlag’s dissociative aesthetic of law. He
observes:
[Roberto Unger’s work], more than any other recent manifestation of American
Critical Legal Studies, has a vision of aesthetic ‘negative capability’ at its core. Negative
capability emerges as the most recent development of a perennial concern, the capacity
to reinvent our emotional connection with others outside institutional structures that are
meant to contain and condition them.
GEAREY, supra note 417, at 99; cf. Schlag, supra note 404, at 1098 (noting that the
“breakdown and reconstruction is perhaps the most intense aesthetic moment in law”).
430 Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead, Introduction to LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY
OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 10 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999)
(emphasis added).

BLOMQUIST.FINALFORPUBLISHER.DOC

2008]

1/16/2008 10:45:32 AM

Concurrence, Posner-Style

115

thinking about some concurring opinions (and, perhaps, many
dissenting opinions) is to think of these appellate opinions as
performative language which seeks to develop alternative visions of
the meaning and potential of law. Thus, being concerned about the
aesthetics of judicial concurring opinion style can help lawyers and
judges to restate and reconceptualize the law.
As law and
aesthetics theorists have written in this regard: “If the law works
through the creation and projection of ordered worlds, attention to
style, detail, and form will help one understand law’s hidden vision
and develop alternative worlds and visions that derive their
legitimacy from repressed texts, histories, and traditions.” 431 Based
on this idea, would we conclude that Judge Posner is an artistic
concurring judge (some, most, or all of the time)? How would we
grade other appellate judges?
6. If we are to take concurring judicial opinions seriously—by
expecting that some opinions might help improve the law over time
as other judges take a second look at particular legal doctrines,
principles, interpretations and the like—we should also consider the
aesthetic musings of Philip Fisher who has written an entire book
on the human “ongoing [provisional] project of making sense” of the
world “rather than the nature of knowing” things in the sense of
“what Descartes called certain knowledge.” 432 A good judicial
concurring opinion, then, might be thought of in terms of which
Fisher has described as “a common poetics of wonder, a map of the
features of thinking that guide us to satisfaction and a feeling of
intelligibility within experience” not “knowing” it in Cartesian terms
of clear and distinct ideas. 433
V. CONCLUSION
This Article started off with some background thoughts and
differing views on the general nature of concurring judicial opinions.
Then, after a brief statistical overview of Judge Richard A. Posner’s
concurrences during his first twenty-five years as a federal
Id. These interdisciplinary scholars define their project in broader terms as well:
This collection [of essays] is the first attempt to develop a specifically legal iconology,
to draw on the critical procedures of law, art history, and cultural studies in order to
consolidate a new interdisciplinary field of visual culture and law. The focus is on the
diverse interfaces between law and the artistic image.
Id. at 11.
432 PHILIP FISHER, WONDER, THE RAINBOW, AND THE AESTHETICS OF RARE EXPERIENCES 8
(1998).
433 Id. (emphasis added).
431
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appellate judge, ten ways to look at Posner’s concurrences were
explored: (1) Posner as congressional adviser—opinions that
highlight his far-ranging intellect and energy; (2) law and economics
analysis which is the leitmotif of many of his judicial opinions; (3)
Posner as an institutional critic; (4) two views on whether Judge
Posner is a nitpicker in his opinions; (5) instances of the law
professor as judge by reference to various hypothetical examples set
forth in Posner’s opinions; (6) Posner’s penchant for cutting Gordian
Knots in his opinions; (7) his pragmatic reading and interpretation
of statutes; (8) Posner’s focus on arriving at appropriate standards
of judicial review; (9) the bracing directness and frank commentary
in his opinions; and (10) Judge Posner’s willingness to add his
thoughts and takes in en banc cases before the entire appellate
court.
The Article, then, transitioned from specific commentary to
general observations. First, I characterized the over-arching style of
Judge Posner’s concurring opinions as focused on strategic
inspiration of consubstantiality—building analytical bridges with
his judicial colleagues’ opinions on matters of law and policy that
are important to Posner. Second, I dipped into the nascent
literature on law and aesthetics to explore some potential larger
purposes of judicial concurring opinions, in general, and to raise
some unanswered questions.

